SLWUTAH, L.C v. Jerry W. Griffiths and Juna E. Griffiths : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1997
SLWUTAH, L.C v. Jerry W. Griffiths and Juna E.
Griffiths : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Ross C Anderson; Anderson & Karrenberg; Attorneys for Appellees.
Jeffery L Silvestrini; Cohne, Rappaport, Segal, P.C.; Attorneys for Appellants.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, SLWUTAH, L.C v. Griffiths, No. 970497 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1997).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1030









APPEAL FROM SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF THIRD DISTRICT CO I RT 
JUDGE ANNE M. STIRBA 
Ross C. Anderson 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Attorneys for Appellees 
50 West Broadway, #700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 534-1700 
Jeffrey L. Silvestrini (Bar No. 2959) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
Attorneys for Appellants 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801)532-2666 
ARGUMENT PRIORITY: 15 








Civil No. 960902644PR 
APPEAL FROM SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
JUDGE ANNE M. STDtBA 
Ross C. Anderson 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Attorneys for Appellees 
50 West Broadway, #700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 534-1700 
Jeffrey L. Silvestrini (Bar No. 2959) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
Attorneys for Appellants 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801)532-2666 
ARGUMENT PRIORITY: 15 
List of Parties: 
All parties are reflected in the caption 
— , E OF CONTENTS 
Page 
i . 1 
M \TTMENT01 ^ r- o r PtA
 t 
DLlLmUll lAlA L STATUTES AND RULL_ 2 
or
" ATEMENT o r ^HE CA OT^ 2 
,, ; ur ' 3 
' U..I \ R G U M E I N i' 7 
n evidence Was Impermissibly Utilized By the Trial Com I . . 7 
Trial Conn Erred as a Matter of Law in Its Interpretation til I he 
8 
1 I rial court Ignored the Griffiths' Equitable Argument 9 
AI'iillMliNT 10 
:
'<\RO <\ >~s-. i L'luJZEI "7, 
iRIAi i ..»UK1 LNi. ix i^,i VHE LEASE ) 
s
 -ixirinsic Eviui ' \T> . W U M I the »
 t l t j s 
Jnambiguous. 10 
„ . ._n Contraci ii^-i^icw 'ill be Determined by Extrinsic 
Evidence of Intent, it Becomes a Question of Fact. If Such Intent is 
Disputed, a Question of Material Fact Exists 13 
RIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF L,\ *\ 
cKPRETATION OF THE LEASE 16 
"impair" Does Not Mean "Replac" *?'•''• 
construct" 16 
^. The Various Clauses of the Lease Were Not Construec 
ler 26 
III. THE TRIAL COURT IGNORED THE G SUITABLE 
ARGUMENT 32 
L'UNC.'I USK >N 37 
I 
TABLE OF CASES, STATUTES AND AUTHORITIES 
Page 
Cages 
Allen v. Fisher. 49 A. 477 28 
Amjacs Interwest v. Design Assocs.. 635 P.2d 53 (Utah 1981) 2 
Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l Bank. 737 P.2d 225 (Utah 1987) 2, 3, 13 
Ball v. Wyeth. 8 Allen, Mass. 275 28 
Berman v. Berman. 749 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1988) 18 
Bonneville on the Hill Co. v. Sloane. 572 P.2d402, 403 (Utah 1977) 17, 32 
Broderick Wood Products Co. v. U.S.. 195 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1952) 27 
Chicago City Bank & Trust Co. v. Ceres Terminals. 417 N.E.2d 798, 805 
(111. App. 1981) 21 
Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen Bros. Const.. 731 P.2d 483, 488 (Utah 1986) 26 
Copper State Leasing Co. v. Blacker Appliance & Furniture Co.. 770 P.2d 88, 90 (Utah 
1988) 13 
Expert Corp. v. La Salle Nat'l Bank. 496 N.E.2d 3 ail. App. 1986) 18 
Fashion Place Inv.. Ltd. v. Salt Lake County Mental Health. 776 P.2d 941, 943 (Utah 
App. 1989), cert, denied, 783 P.2d 53 (1989) 13 
Faulkner v. Farnsworth. 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983) 10 
First Sec. Bank of Utah. N.A. v. Maxwell. 659 P.2d 1078, 1081 (Utah 1983) 33 
Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Dennis. 645 P.2d 672 (Utah App. 1982) 18 
Judkins v. Charette. 151 N.E. 81 28 
ii 
King v. Richards-Cunningham Co.. 28 P.2d 492 (Wyo. 1934) 28 
Levitz Furniture Co. v. Continental Equities. 411 So. 2d 221, 224 
(Fla. App. 1982) 21 
Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark. 755 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah App. 1988) . . 2, 3, 15, 32 
Miller v.Belknap. 266 P.2d 662, 665 (Idaho 1954) 27, 28 
Mills v. U.S.. 52 Ct.Cl. 452 (1917), 32 Am.Jur., Landlord and Tenant, 
Sec. 789 28 
Mobil Oil Credit Corp. v. DST Realty. Inc.. 689 S.W.2d 658 
(Mo. App. 1985) 18-21, 30, 34-36 
Morris v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.. 658 P.2d 1199, 1201 (Utah 1983) . . . 26 
Petition of First Interstate Bank. 767 P.2d 792, 795 (Colo. App. 1988) 27 
Plateau Min. v. Utah Div. of State Lands. 802 P.2d 720 (Utah 1990) 2 
I I 
Ouebe v. Davis. 586N.E.2d914 (Ind. App. 1992) 18, 21 
Realty & Rebuilding Co. v. REA. 194 P. 1024 (Cal. 1920) 18, 23 
Records v.Briggs. 887 P.2d 864, 871 (Utah App. 1994) 13, 15 
Republic Group v. Won-Door Corp.. 883 P.2d 285, 294 
(Utah App. 1994) 10 
Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving. Inc. v. Blomquist. 773 P.2d 1382 
(Utah 1989) 2, 12 
Sandelman v. Buckeve Realty. Inc.. 576N.E.2d 1038 (111. App. 1991) . . . 18, 22, 23, 30 
Sanka Classics v. Atlantic Terra Cotta Co.. 79 N.Y.S.2d 748 (N.Y.App. 1948) . . . . 31 
Santillanes v. Property Management Services. 716 P.2d 1360, 1364 
(Idaho App. 1986) 29 
iii 
Saunders v. Sharp. 806 P.2d 198, 200 (Utah 1991) 10 
Scott v. Prazma. 555 P.2d 571 (Wyo. 1976) 18, 20, 23, 30, 33, 35, 36 
Shum v. Gaudreau. 562 A.2d 707 (Md. 1989) 28 
Sorenson v. Beers. 585 P.2d458, 460 (Utah 1978) 26 
United Cities Realty Corp. v. Price & Schumacher Co.. 151 N.E. 150, 151-52 (N.Y. App. 
1926) 35 
Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner. 636 P.2d 1060, 1061-62 (Utah 1981) 27 
Warburton v. Va. Beach Fed. Sav. & Loan. 899 P.2d 779, 782 (Utah App. 1995) . . . 17 
Wingetsr Inc. v. Bitters. 500 P.2d 1007 (Utah 1972) 33 
Won-Door Corp.. 883 P.2d at 294 13 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(j) (1953) 1 
Other 
1 M. Friedman, Friedman on Leases, Sec. 10.502, p.653 (3d ed. 1990) 31 
45 A.L.R. Annot. 70 28 
76 Corpus Juris Secundum p. 1170 (1952) 23 
American and English Encyclopedia of Law, vol. 18 (2d Ed) 252 31 
Howard, 8 The Practical Lawyer 15, 16 (1962), "The Essential Elements of a 
Net Lease" 14 
iv 
Restatement (Second), Property (Landlord and Tenant), Sec. 13.1, 
comment c. (1977) 20, 35 
Van Doren, 51 Columbia Law Review 186, "Some Suggestions for the Drafting of Long 
Term Net and Percentage Leases" (1951) 11 
v 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(j) (1953). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether a written agreement was properly interpreted by the trial court upon a motion 
for summary judgment, including the following issues: 
(1) whether parol evidence was impermissibly utilized by the trial court in order 
to interpret the lease, particularly when the contract was found to be unambiguous; 
(2) whether the trial court correctly followed the rule of law that when contract 
interpretation will be determined by extrinsic evidence of intent, and such intent is disputed, 
the existence of material facts preclude entry of summary judgment; 
(3) whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in its interpretation of the lease, 
insofar as the trial court failed to find that "repair" does not mean "replace", "rebuild", or 
"reconstruct", and insofar as the trial court failed to construe the various clauses of the lease 
harmoniously, and; 
(4) whether the trial court erred by ignoring the Griffiths* equitable argument. 
This matter is on appeal from the district court's grant of summary judgment in 
favor of SLW/Utah, L.C. A copy of the trial court's Order entered May 15, 1997 is 
included in the Addendum hereto, Exhibit "A" (R. 194-195). The issues were preserved 
for appeal by the filing of a Notice of Appeal of that Order on June 12, 1997, R. 200 - 201 
and 197 -199. Utah appellate courts review a trial court's grant of summary judgment for 
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correctness, giving no particular deference to the trial court's conclusions of law. Plateau 
Min. v. Utah Div. of State Lands. 802 P.2d 720 (Utah 1990), citing Ron Case Roofing & 
Asphalt Paving. Inc. v. Blomquist 773 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989). In determining whether 
a material issue of fact exists, the Court of Appeals does not defer to a trial court's 
conclusion on the matter. Id The filing of cross-motions for summary judgment does not 
necessarily mean that material issues of fact do not exist. IdL, citing Amjacs Interwest v. 
Design Assocs.. 635 P.2d 53 (Utah 1981). Furthermore, in reviewing the grant of 
summary judgment, this Court is to liberally construe the facts and view the evidence in 
a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v. 
Clark. 755 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah App. 1988), citing Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l Bank. 737 
P.2d 225 (Utah 1987). After reviewing such facts, if there is a dispute as to a material 
issue of fact, this Court must reverse the trial court's determination and remand for trial. 
Id, 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
There is no Utah statute which is determinative of the issues in this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
SLW/Utah, L.C. ("SLW") commenced this action for declaratory relief based upon 
a written lease agreement between SLW as landlord and Jerry W. Griffiths and Juna E. 
Griffiths (the "Griffiths") as tenants. SLW prayed for relief in the form of a ruling 
requiring that the Griffiths install a new roof on the leased premises. R. 1-3, Complaint. 
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The Griffiths answered that by the terms of the lease, they were not responsible for 
replacement of the roof, and counterclaimed for reimbursement for the costs of such 
replacement and for damages based on their losses caused by the faulty roof. R. 12-18, 
Answer and Counterclaim. The Griffiths moved for partial summary judgement based on 
the fact that the lease, by its own terms, did not require replacement of the roof. R. 28-29, 
Motion for Summary Judgment. SLW countered with its own motion for summary 
judgment, claiming that the lease assigned the Griffiths the duty of roof replacement as a 
matter of law. R. 66-67, Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. The District Court, 
in its oral ruling, denied the Griffiths' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and entered 
judgment in favor of SLW. R. 215, Partial Transcript of Hearing. The Griffiths 
subsequently commenced this appeal. R. 200-201, Notice of Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
1. The Griffiths and SLW entered into a lease agreement which commenced on 
June 1, 1986 and is set to continue for a period of fifteen years, until May 31, 2001. R. 
48, Lease Agreement, Article 1.2. A copy of the lease is included in the Addendum 
hereto, Exhibit "B." (R. 48-56). 
2In reviewing a summary judgment, the Court of Appeals is to liberally construe 
the facts and view the evidence in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. 
Luckv Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark. 755 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah App. 1988), citing Atlas 
Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l Bank. 737 P.2d 225 (Utah 1987). 
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2. The lease was drafted by SLW, particularly the provisions as to the Griffiths' 
duty of maintenance. The parties engaged in very little negotiation respecting the terms 
of the lease, and the Griffiths did not have significant input into the language of the lease. 
R. 128, 129, (Second) Affidavit of Jerry W. Griffiths, fjf 11, 14. 
3. When the parties discussed the terms of the lease, no mention was ever made 
that the Griffiths were to be responsible for the replacement of the roof. R. 127, (Second) 
Affidavit of Jerry W. Griffiths, U 5. 
4. In announcing the duties of the Griffiths, the lease makes no mention of the 
word "replace" or "replacements". R. 50, Lease Agreement, Article 4. Rather, the lease 
provides at Article 4: 
4.1 Maintenance. Tenant shall commit no waste and shall take good care of the 
Premises and make all repairs necessitated by Tenant's misuse of the Premises. 
Tenant shall maintain and keep in repair the plumbing, electrical and heating, 
ventilation and air conditioning systems and the equipment, fixtures, appurtenances 
to said systems, and other installations servicing more than one tenant of the 
building. In addition to the above, Tenant shall maintain and keep in repair (and 
shall put into repair where necessary) the walls and roof of the building of which 
the Premises form a part and the sidewalks in front thereof and black top road 
surfaces. 
4.2 Premises - End of Lease. The Premises shall be surrendered to Landlord at 
the end of the term in as good condition as it was at the beginning of the term, 
reasonable wear excepted. 
R. 49, Lease Agreement, p.2. 
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5. Throughout the term of the lease the Griffiths made repairs to the roof where 
necessary. R. 45, Affidavit of Jerry W. Griffiths, U 3; R. 128, 129, (Second) Affidavit of 
Jerry W.Griffiths, % 13. 
6. However, with the snowmelt and wet weather in late winter 1996, the roof 
over the west portion of the premises failed completely. The result of the roof's failure was 
approximately $100,000.00 in damage to the Griffiths' property. R. 130, (Second) 
Affidavit of Jerry W. Griffiths, If 18. 
7. At the time of this roof failure, the roof had been in place for approximately 
23 years. R. 58, Affidavit of Carl R. Clark, ^  8; R. 33, R. 69, Griffiths' Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, p.3, and SLW's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Griffiths' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, p.2. 
8. The customary maximum life expectancy of a commercial roof is 20 years. 
R. 58, Affidavit of Carl R. Clark, f 7. 
9. At the time of the roof failure, the condition of the roof was such that Carl 
R. Clark, a roof repairman, determined the roof could no longer be repaired. Instead, the 
condition of the roof required replacement, because the roof was so decrepit that repair 
was no longer practicable nor feasible. The roof had outlived its useful life expectancy by 
three to five years. R. 58, 59, Affidavit of Carl R. Clark, fflf 6-8. 
10. The Griffiths attempted to reach an equitable solution with SLW, as the lease 
term was two thirds over, with only five years left. However, SLW was unwilling to 
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agree to such a solution. R.46, Affidavit of Jerry W. Griffiths, fflf 8-12; R. 129-130, 
(Second) Affidavit of Jerry W. Griffiths, ffl[ 16, 18. 
11. Due to the extent of the damage the Griffiths sustained as a direct result of 
the roof failure, the Griffiths were forced to replace the roof with a new, membrane-type 
roof on the west portion of the premises. R. 130, (Second) Affidavit of Jerry W. Griffiths, 
lfl8; R. 58-59, Affidavit of Carl R. Clark, ^ 8. 
12. The cost of installing this replacement roof was $173,280.00. SLW made 
no effort to help the Griffiths with such cost. R.46, Affidavit of Jerry W. Griffiths, f^lj 8-
12. 
13. This new roof will last for 20 years, 15 years after the Griffiths' lease 
expires. Therefore, nearly the entire benefit of the new roof will inure to SLW, though 
SLW refused to help with the costs of this roof. R.46, Affidavit of Jerry W. Griffiths, «[f 9-
11; R. 58-59, Affidavit of Carl R. Clark, % 10. 
14. Between the cost of replacement of the roof and the damages caused by roof 
failure, the Griffiths have spent over $273,900.00. The base rent for an entire year of the 
premises is $352,479.00. R.46, Affidavit of Jerry W. Griffiths, T[12; R. 130, (Second) 
Affidavit of Jerry W. Griffiths, % 18. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. Parol Evidence Was Impermissibly Utilized By the Trial Court. 
Utah law provides that extrinsic evidence may not be introduced in order to prove 
the "true" intent of the parties, when such intent can be deduced from the four corners of 
an unambiguous contract. In this case, SLW introduced a barrage of parol evidence in 
order to prove the intent of the parties, despite the fact that both parties claimed that the 
contract was unambiguous. Although the Griffiths adamantly objected to the introduction 
of such extrinsic evidence, the trial court never ruled on this objection. Instead, the trial 
court noted in its decision that SLW was arguing that the agreement was a "net" lease -
the substance of SLWfs extrinsic evidence - and proceeded to rule accordingly. To the 
extent that the trial court considered and failed to strike or exclude SLW's parol evidence, 
despite the fact that the court ruled the contract was "unambiguous", the court was in 
error. 
Furthermore, the parol evidence which was allowed was directly disputed by the 
Griffiths. This parol evidence went to the intent of the parties. If extrinsic proof of intent 
is disputed, it follows that a question of material fact exists, rendering summary judgment 
inappropriate. Accordingly, the court erred by granting SLW's Motion for Summary 
Judgment in light of the fact that a genuine dispute existed re: the parties' intent. 
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2. The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law in Its Interpretation of the Lease. 
The trial court's interpretation of the lease ignored the clear language of the lease, 
the effect of the surrender clause, and failed to account for the fact that SLW wrote the 
lease. In Utah, the ordinary and usual meaning of words is to be given effect. However, 
the "ordinary and usual" meaning of the word "repair" is not "replace" or "rebuild". 
Courts which have defined the term "repair" have explicitly ruled that this word does not 
entail structural replacements. Additionally, SLW knew how and when it wished to use the 
term "replacement", as it is found in a separate portion of the lease agreement. This word 
is not present in the clause covering "maintenance". Therefore, by interpreting the term 
"repair" as one actually meaning "to replace", the court erred as a matter of law. 
Alternatively, if the trial court is to interpret "repair" as something other than its ordinary and 
usual meaning, this could only occur after questions of fact concerning intent have been 
answered - questions which may not be decided upon summary judgment. 
Furthermore, the trial court also ignored the rule of construction that, when 
construing a covenant to determine the intent of the parties, if there is any uncertainty in 
the language, it should be strictly construed against the landlord, who furnished the lease. 
SLW drafted the lease at issue. Because the court did not follow the proper rule of 
construction, its interpretation is incorrect as a matter of law. 
Finally, the trial court erred by failing to construe the various clauses of the lease 
together. Specifically, the trial court failed to read the duty to repair in conjunction with 
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the surrender clause, which allows the premises to be returned in good condition, 
reasonable wear excepted. A promise to repair is modified by such a clause; however, 
under the court's interpretation, the surrender clause was rendered superfluous. This 
interpretation therefore is incorrect as a matter of law. At the least, this interpretation 
requires a factual inquiry as to whether the damage to the roof was caused by "reasonable 
wear". 
3. The Trial Court Ignored the Griffiths' Equitable Argument. 
In opposition to SLW's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Griffiths put forth an 
argument that it would be inequitable to force the Griffiths to pay for a new roof, the 
benefit of which will inure almost entirely to the landlord. The replacement of the roof was 
not something that was bargained for in the lease, and has forced the Griffiths to return the 
premises in much better condition than when originally leased. 
However, the trial court apparently ignored this argument, as no mention is made 
of it in the Partial Transcript of Hearing. The question of whether it is equitable to force 
the Griffiths to supply their landlord with a new roof which the Griffiths will enjoy for 
only one-quarter of its expected life, should have been considered; at a minimum it 




I. PAROL EVIDENCE WAS IMPERMISSIBLY UTILIZED BY THE 
TRIAL COURT IN ORDER TO INTERPRET THE LEASE 
A. Extrinsic Evidence is Not Permissible When the Contract is 
Unambiguous. 
It is a basic rule of contract interpretation that parol evidence is not admissible to 
alter or define an unambiguous document. "The interpretation of a written contract is first 
a question of law determined by the words of the agreement... Accordingly, whether an 
ambiguity exists is also a question of law to be decided by the trial court before 
considering extrinsic evidence." Republic Group v. Won-Door Corp.. 883 P.2d 285, 294 
(Utah App. 1994), citing Saunders v. Sharp. 806 P.2d 198, 200 (Utah 1991), and Faulkner 
v. Farnsworth. 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983). 
The trial court ignored this basic rule, and impermissibly considered parol evidence 
offered by SLW. This consideration took place despite the fact that the trial court explicitly 
held that the contract was "unambiguous". See R. 215, Partial Transcript of Hearing, at 
p.4. The admission of the extrinsic evidence necessarily changed the interpretation of the 
lease. This is the fundamental reason for excluding such evidence. Therefore, the grant of 
summary judgment should be reversed. 
The parol evidence at issue pertained to SLW's argument that the lease in fact was 
a "net lease", a type of lease which changes the normal relationships one might expect 
between landlord and tenant. As noted by Durand H. Van Doren, a "net lease": 
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shifts the burdens of ownership, for a stated period, from the landowner to 
the occupant, and reserves to the owner during that period a net return on his 
investment. Such leases are usually, but not always, for a long period of 
years, during which the landlord foregoes the speculative advantages of 
ownership in return for the agreed net rental. The tenant, in turn, gambles 
on the continued value of the location and the improvement. He pays the 
taxes, insurance premiums, and operating charges, maintains the property, 
and assumes all the risks in connection therewith. 
Van Doren, 51 Columbia Law Review 186, "Some Suggestions for the Drafting of Long 
Term Net and Percentage Leases "(1951). 
Parol evidence was presented by SLW for the first time in its Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. This included the following "statements of fact" 
concerning intent: 
"SLW's successor wanted a fixed yield with no out-of-pocket expenses on 
the building for any reason", see R. 70, Plaintiff's Memorandum in 
Opposition, % 2; 
"In order to provide the Griffiths their own reserve to cover repair, 
depreciation, and replacement, the increase in rent negotiated with the 
Griffiths based on inflation (the CPI increase) was cut in half... [t]he Griffiths 
received the other 50% for reserves for any repairs and/or replacement of 
capital items", kL at Tf 4, and; 
"It was expressly discussed with Mr. Griffiths that the Griffiths were 
responsible for whatever care the building needed during the 15-year lease 
term, including all necessary repairs and upkeep." Id. at If 5. 
These and other statements concerning the "intent" of the parties consume both the 
factual and argument sections of SLW's Opposition Brief. R. 71-84. Although the 
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Griffiths adamantly objected to the use of such extrinsic evidence, see R. 113-119, 
Defendant's Reply Memorandum, pp. 8-14, and controverted the same in affidavits, see 
R. 126-130, Affidavit of Jerry W. Griffiths, R. 132-135, Affidavit of Juna E. Griffiths, 
the trial court took such evidence into consideration, while failing to respond to the 
Griffiths' objection.2 That die trial court considered such evidence is implied on the first 
page of the Transcript: "The plaintiff contends that it is not liable because this is a net 
lease and that, as such, the landlord will only receive a fixed rent without any other 
charges." See R. 215, Partial Transcript of Hearing, at p.2 (emphasis added). The 
transcript is devoid of any mention of the Griffiths' objection. 
There is nothing in the lease itself which states that the agreement was to be a "net" 
lease. Nevertheless, the trial court incorporated SLW's argument that the lease was "net" 
into its decision. The only information available to the trial court from which it could 
discern that a "net" lease was intended by either party was the inadmissible, contested 
parol evidence introduced by SLW. 
As noted in Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt, supra, "[a party's] contention about what 
it really intended and its attempt to rely on extrinsic evidence in support of that contention 
ignores the settled rule that in interpreting a contract, we first look to the four corners of 
the agreement to determine the intention of the parties." Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt. 773 
2The trial court never ruled on the Griffiths' objections. See R. 215, Partial 
Transcript of Hearing. 
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P.2d at 1385, citing Atlas Corp.. 737 P.2d at 229. Because the trial court allowed and 
considered disputed parol evidence as to intent, despite the fact that the court held the lease 
to be "unambiguous", the trial court ignored this rule, and erred as a matter of law in its 
interpretation of the contract. 
B. When Contract Interpretation Will be Determined by Extrinsic Evidence 
of Intent, it Becomes a Question of Fact. If Such Intent is Disputed, a 
Question of Material Fact Exists. 
"When contract interpretation will be determined by extrinsic evidence of intent, 
it becomes a question of fact." Won-Door Corp., 883 P.2d at 294, citing Copper State 
Leasing Co. v. Blacker Appliance & Furniture Co.. 770 P.2d 88, 90 (Utah 1988). 
Accordingly, if this extrinsic evidence is disputed, "then a material fact is also disputed, 
and summary judgment cannot be granted." Records v. Briggs. 887 P.2d 864, 871 (Utah 
App. 1994), citing Fashion Place Inv.. Ltd. v. Salt Lake County Mental Health. 776 P.2d 
941, 943 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied, 783 P.2d 53 (1989). Because there was a factual 
dispute as to whether or not a "net" lease was intended by the parties - that is, a lease that 
would place the burden of replacing the roof on the Griffiths - SLW's Motion for 
Summary Judgment was improperly granted by the trial court. 
As noted by Norman A. Howard: 
If a landlord can make a lease under which he can impose upon the tenant 
the obligation to pay all real estate taxes, assessments, insurance, the cost of 
repairs, and all other expenses of operating and maintaining the property, 
then any rental payable directly to the landlord is considered a "net rental , 
and the lease that imposes such an obligation upon the tenant is considered 
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a Net Lease...A lease that does not have all of the characteristics of a Net 
Lease is called a Gross Lease. 
Howard, 8 The Practical Lawyer 15, 16 (1962), "The Essential Elements of a Net Lease". 
The lease at issue here did not contain each of these requirements. In fact, the lease never 
mentions the word "net", nor gives any indication that a "net" lease was intended. For 
this reason, SLW introduced extrinsic evidence as to the "real" intent of the parties to 
make the lease a "net" lease. See R. 68-84, SLW's Memorandum in Opposition, supra. 
The Griffiths directly disputed such evidence in their Reply Memorandum, at R. 106-125, 
the (Second) Affidavit of Jerry W. Griffiths, R. 126-130, and the Affidavit of Juna E. 
Griffiths, R. 132-135. Therefore, there were questions of fact which should not have 
been decided by the trial court on summary judgment. 
In the Griffiths1 Reply Memorandum, R. 106-125, the Griffiths specifically denied 
certain factual allegations made by SLW as to the parties1 intent to create a Mnet,f lease: 
(1) On page 4, paragraph 2 (R. 109) it states, "Griffiths dispute that 
it was ever discussed in negotiating the lease that the transaction was a 'triple 
net/sales/leasebackf and both Jerry and Juna Griffiths deny any discussion that 
the tenants were to be responsible to replace the roof or to make other 
significant replacements." This factual dispute is based on the (Second) 
Affidavit of Jerry W. Griffiths, R. 126-27, ffi[ 3-6, and the Affidavit of Juna E. 
Griffiths, R.133, ffif 3-4. 
(2) In the following paragraph, the Griffiths state, "Griffiths dispute 
any discussion about lowering lease payments as an alternative to providing 
for a reserve for replacement and depreciation." R. 109, f 3. This factual 
dispute is based on the (Second) Affidavit of Jerry W. Griffiths, R. 128-29, ffif 
10-13, and the Affidavit of Juna E. Griffiths, R.133, ffi[ 7-8. 
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(3) The Griffiths state in the following paragraph that, "Griffiths 
dispute that the CPI adjustment to the rent was modified or reduced or that 
'Griffiths received the other 50% for reserves, for any repairs, and/or 
replacement of capital items'". R. 110, }^ 5. This factual dispute was again 
based on the (Second) Affidavit of Jerry W. Griffiths, R. 127, f^ 7, and the 
Affidavit of Juna E. Griffiths, R.133, fflj 5-8. 
(4) Finally, in paragraph 5, "Griffiths deny there was ever any 
discussion that Griffiths were responsible for whatever care the building 
needed beyond repairs". R. 110. This factual dispute was based on the 
(Second) Affidavit of Jerry W. Griffiths, R. 127, ^ 5, and the Affidavit of Juna 
E.Griffiths, R.133,1| 4. 
These factual disputes bear directly on the parties' intent in creating the lease 
agreement. Though SLW argued that the lease was "net", and therefore forced upon the 
Griffiths a burden greater than that actually written into the contract, the Griffiths disputed 
such intent, and argued that the contract should be enforced as written. Accordingly, the 
trial court not only impermissibly considered extrinsic evidence to interpret the lease at 
issue, but committed another error by ruling in favor of SLW's Motion for Summary 
Judgment despite the fact that SLW's extrinsic evidence was directly disputed. This 
dispute as to intent evidences the existence of genuine issues of material fact, precluding 
summary judgment. 
As is often noted by the courts of this state, "[o]ne sworn statement under oath is 
all that is needed to dispute the averments on the other side of the controversy and create 
an issue of fact, precluding the entry of summary judgment." Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp.. 
755 P.2d at 752 (citations omitted); also see Records v. Briggs. 887 P.2d at 871. Here, 
there are multiple sworn statements which directly dispute that a "net" lease was ever 
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intended by the parties, as set forth in the affidavits of Juna E. and Jerry W. Griffiths. 
Such statements were sufficient to prevent the grant of SLW's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Because such statements were overlooked by the trial court, this Court should 
reverse the ruling of the lower court. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN ITS 
INTERPRETATION OF THE LEASE 
A. "Repair" Does Not Mean "Replace", "Rebuild", or "Reconstruct". 
The trial court determined that the phrase "tenant shall maintain and keep in repair 
(and shall put into repair, where necessary) the walls and roof of the building of which the 
premises are a part", required Griffiths to replace the roof. See R. 215, Partial Transcript 
of Hearing, at pp. 2, 4. This interpretation ignores the clear language of the lease, and as 
a matter of law misinterprets the lease. Alternatively, if the trial court is to interpret 
"repair" as something other than its ordinary and usual meaning, this could only occur 
after questions of fact concerning intent have been answered - questions which may not be 
decided upon motion for summary judgment. 
The language at issue states as follows: 
4.1 Maintenance. Tenant shall commit no waste and shall take good care of 
the Premises and make all repairs necessitated by Tenant's misuse of the 
Premises. Tenant shall maintain and keep in repair the plumbing, electrical 
and heating, ventilation and air conditioning systems and the equipment, 
fixtures, appurtenances to said systems, and other installations servicing 
more than one tenant of the building. In addition to the above, Tenant shall 
maintain and keep in repair (and shall put into repair where necessary) 
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the walls and roof of the building of which the Premises form a part and 
the sidewalks in front thereof and black top road surfaces. 
4.2 Premises - End of Lease. The Premises shall be surrendered to 
Landlord at the end of the term in as good condition as it was at the 
beginning of the term, reasonable wear excepted. 
(Emphasis added.) R. 49, Lease Agreement, p.2. 
When construing a covenant to determine the intent of the parties from the language 
of the lease itself, "a foundational rule is that if there is any doubt or uncertainty in the 
language, it should be strictly construed against the plaintiff landlord, who furnished the 
lease and required the tenant to sign". Bonneville on the Hill Co. v. Sloane. 572 P.2d 402, 
403 (Utah 1977). This foundational rule was not followed by the trial court. 
The lease at issue was written by SLW, and the necessary documents were prepared 
by SLW. See R. 128, 129, (Second) Affidavit of Jerry W. Griffiths, fflf 11,15, and, R. 133, 
Affidavit of Juna E. Griffiths, R.133, fflj 6, 9. Nevertheless, the trial court held that, despite 
the fact that "there are two interpretations of that provision advanced,f shall put into repair1, 
one being that it means, in essence, to replace...[t]he other that it means repair at the outset, 
where necessary", see R. 215, Partial Transcript of Hearing, at p. 3, and despite the fact that 
the parties intended different meanings to attach to this terminology, the landlord's 
interpretation of this phrase controlled. This is incorrect as a matter of law, or, at the very 
least, evidences a factual dispute as to the intent of the parties. 
When interpreting contracts, "the ordinary and usual meaning of the words used is 
given effect". Warburton v. Va. Beach Fed. Sav. & Loan. 899 P.2d 779, 782 (Utah App. 
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1995), citing Berman v. Berman. 749 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1988). The "ordinary and usual" 
meaning is often best derived from standard, non-legal dictionaries. IdL, citing 
Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Dennis. 645 P.2d 672 (Utah App. 1982). Because the 
"ordinary and usual" meaning of "repair" does not mean to "replace", "reconstruct", or 
"rebuild", the trial court's interpretation to the contrary should be reversed. Furthermore, 
if the parties intended a meaning other than "repair" - a question which was directly 
disputed - what the parties intended should have been a question for the jury, rather than 
one to be considered and decided on summary judgment. 
A number of cases throughout the country have analyzed the meaning of the term 
"repair" in various contexts. In each of these cases, the term "repair" was held not to 
mean the performance of structural changes. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Credit Corp. v. DST 
Realty. Inc.. 689 S.W.2d 658 (Mo. App. 1985), Sandelman v. Buckeye Realty. Inc.. 576 
N.E.2d 1038 (111. App. 1991), Scott v. Prazma. 555 P.2d 571 (Wyo. 1976), Expert Corp. 
v. La Salle Nat'l Bank. 496 N.E.2d 3 (111. App. 1986), Ouebe v. Davis. 586 N.E.2d 914 
(Ind. App. 1992), Realty & Rebuilding Co. v. REA. 194 P. 1024 (Cal. 1920). Because 
the lease at issue here only used the term "repair" in its assignment of obligations to the 
Griffiths, the Griffiths are not responsible for the replacement or rebuilding of the roof, 
and should be compensated for their expenditures. 
In Expert Corp. v. La Salle Nat'l Bank, supra, the lease at issue made the lessee 
generally responsible for repairs of the commercial premises. Sometime into the lease, it 
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was discovered that a wall was structurally unsound and needed to be reconstructed. 
Lessee sought a declaration from the court that the lessor was responsible for such 
replacement. Lessor then pointed to the lease, which purported to hold lessee responsible 
for all repairs. The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of lessee, due 
to the extensiveness of such work. Id at p. 4. In affirming this ruling, the appellate court 
noted that, while under the contract the lessee had a general duty to "repair": 
we agree that [lessee] does not have a duty to engage in extensive 
reconstruction necessary to correct the problem here; reconstruction, as the 
court found, means rebuilding and not repairing. 
l i , at p. 5 (emphasis added). The court added that, "[w]hile the parties are free to agree 
otherwise, the lease here does not use the term 'structure*". Id Therefore, lessee, as a 
matter of law, was not required to reconstruct or rebuild when he had only promised to 
"repair". Id, 
Similarly, in Mobil Oil Credit Corp. v. DST Realty. Inc.. supra, the Missouri Court 
of Appeals held that, "[a] general covenant of a tenant to make ordinary repairs does not 
require him to make structural repairs." 689 S.W.2d at 661. In Mobil Oil, the commercial 
lessee had promised to pay for "building repair" and to "make all repairs to the premises". 
However, two years into the lease, it was discovered that the parking garage would need 
extensive, structural work. The trial court held that the lessee was responsible for one half 
of the expenses of such work, and lessee appealed. The appellate court reversed, finding 
that, as a matter of law, lessee was not responsible for such reconstruction where it had 
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only promised to "repair". "[A] tenant cannot be held for substantial structural repairs 
unless it so specifically agrees in the lease. A general covenant of a tenant to make 
ordinary repairs does not require him to make structural repairs". IcL at p. 661. The Court 
then quoted the Restatement (Second) of Property: 
A promise by the tenant to keep the leased property in repair, unless the 
language of the promise clearly provides otherwise, does not obligate the 
tenant to make repairs other than those that are the result of ordinary wear 
and tear on the leased property. 
Id., citing Restatement (Second), Property (Landlord and Tenant), Sec. 13.1, comment c. 
(1977). 
Therefore, a promise to make repairs and to preserve the premises, ordinary wear 
and tear excepted, meant that rebuilding or reconstruction was, as a matter of law, not a 
burden which the lessee must bear: 
By the terms of the express agreement, [lessee's] obligation was only to keep 
it in its lease-date condition. It had taken over 30 years for the building to 
reach its present, dilapidated state. Patching was no longer feasible for major 
items; reasonable wear and tear had taken its toll. The leasehold is worthless 
if the lessee cannot occupy the premises. 
Id. at p. 662, quoting Scott v. Prazma. 555 P.2d 571, 578. 
Despite the fact that the contract did not specifically assign the duty of replacement 
to the lessee, the lessor in Mobil Oil, like SLW in the instant case, attempted to argue 
that, because the lease was a "net" lease, the lessee was responsible for all such costs. IcL 
at 660. The court disagreed with this analysis: 
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This attempts to create a legal effect in the lease because of what it is called 
rather than what it does. 
IcL at 660-61, citing Levitz Furniture Co. v. Continental Equities. 411 So. 2d 221, 224 
(Fla. App. 1982). As noted in Levitz Furniture, this type of argument is "fallacious". 
Instead, the terms of the lease itself must state the obligations of the parties. Levitz 
Furniture. 411 So. 2d 221. See also Chicago City Bank & Trust Co. v. Ceres Terminals. 
417 N.E.2d 798, 805 (111. App. 1981) ("The better approach...is to examine the lease as 
a whole to determine which rights and obligations are specifically indicated, and resort to 
general usage or constructive principles only where the lease is silent."). Therefore, if the 
contract itself does not provide that the lessee must make structural repairs and 
replacements, simply calling the lease a "net" lease should not create such a duty.3 
In a similar case, the Indiana Court of Appeals held in Ouebe v. Davis. 586 N.E.2d 
914, that "repair" did not mean "replace" in the context of a commercial lease. There, a 
commercial tenant filed suit against its landlord in order to discern who had responsibility 
3SLW made a similar argument at R. 76-79, Memorandum in Opposition, pp. 9-12, 
and at R. 141, Reply Memorandum, p.7. However, this "chicken or the egg" argument, as 
noted in the Mobil Oil Levitz. and Chicago City Bank cases, does nothing to describe the 
actual obligations assigned by the lease at issue. Rather, it merely seeks to exploit the fact 
that SLW has decided to call its lease with the Griffiths a "net" lease. However, since it 
has never been shown that the lease was "net", nor that the Griffiths ever intended to 
subscribe to a "net" lease, the fact that SLW calls this a "net" lease does not entitle it to 
create any and all obligations it now wishes to place upon the Griffiths. Instead, such 
obligations may only come from the words of the lease itself. As noted, supra, these 
obligations do not include replacement or rebuilding. 
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for replacing a worn out roof which could no longer be patched or otherwise repaired. The 
court held for the tenant, noting a distinct difference between "repair" and "replacement": 
[The Landlords] appear unwilling to distinguish between "repair" and 
"replace", arguing vigorously in their reply brief that the lease does not 
include the word "replace"; quoting a dictionary definition of "repair" to 
show the word can mean "restoration to sound or good state after decay, 
dilapidation, injury, loss, waste, etc"...We are unpersuaded...The question 
becomes whether complete replacement of the roof, made necessary by its 
deterioration over time, is properly considered a repair... 
586 N.E.2d at 919. The court held that the replacement of the roof could not be 
considered a "repair", and that under the terms of the lease, tenant could not be held 
responsible for such. Indeed, the court noted that the parties knew when to use terms such 
as "restoration" or "replacement", as they could be found in other parts of the lease. fcL 
The same analysis should have guided the trial court in the instant case.4 Likewise, it 
should now guide this Court towards overruling the grant of summary judgment. 
In Sandelman v. Buckeye Realty, Inc.. 576 N.E.2d 1038, the Illinois Court of 
Appeals was again asked to construe a lease which assigned to the lessee a general 
covenant to repair. There, the lease explicitly stated that it was a "net" lease, and that 
landlord was not obligated for any repairs. Some years after the lease was signed, the 
landlord required that the lessee repair the dilapidated roof which covered the commercial 
premises. However, the trial court determined that the roof could no longer be repaired, 
4Here, the term "replacements" was used only in the context of landlord's potential 
liabilities to the tenant, and tenant's right to rent abatement. See Lease, Section 17.5, R. 
p. 55 and discussion below. 
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but required replacement instead. 576 N.E.2d at 1040. Since "replacement of the roof by 
the tenant" could not be found in the plain language of the lease, landlord was held 
responsible for such replacement. RL On appeal, this holding was affirmed. In doing so, 
the appeal court examined the plain meaning of the term "repair": 
It is instructive to review the ordinary meaning of the word repair as defined 
by Webster's Third New International Dictionary, to wit: to restore by 
replacing a part or putting together what is torn or broken: fix, mend. 
(Citation omitted.) The word "repair" involves the idea of something 
preexisting; the term contemplates an existing structure the condition of 
which has been affected by decay, waste, injury, or partial destruction. (76 
Corpus Juris Secundum p. 1170 (1952).) An ordinary covenant of "good 
repair" does not include replacement of a roof which has become so run 
down that it cannot be repaired. (Citing Scott v. Prazma. 555 P.2d 571.) 
Id. at 1040 (emphasis added). Because the replacement of the roof was not included in a 
covenant to "repair", the Sandelman Court upheld the lower court's decision to hold the 
landlord liable for such costs. 576 N.E.2d at 1040-41. See also Realty & Rebuilding Co. 
v. REA. 194 P. at 1029 ("A general covenant to repair on the part of the tenant 
is.. .binding unless limited by express exception, but such a covenant, even if it be in the 
most general terms, does not constitute an agreement to rebuild unless the term "repair" 
means also to replace. It has no such meaning in its normal sense. To repair means to 
mend an old thing, not to make a new thing".) 
Finally, in Scott v. Prazma. 555 P.2d 571, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that 
a lessee did not have an obligation to "rebuild" when it had only covenanted to "repair". 
There, a commercial lease obligated lessee to "keep in good repair and condition, 
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reasonable wear and tear alone excepted", the premises. Lessor was specifically exempted 
from any such repairs. However, when the city required extensive work to be performed 
on the roof of the leased premises, the court found that such structural changes were not 
required of a lessee who merely covenanted to "repair": 
the more equitable doctrine is that such terms are not technical and do not 
constitute an agreement to rebuild unless the term "repair" means to 
"replace" and it has no such meaning in the ordinary sense. To repair means 
to mend an old thing, not to make a new thing... 
...this court would not strain the term "repair" to reach a harsh result and 
impose some hidden meaning set as a trap not only for the careless 
businessman but also for one relying upon language as usually interpreted 
and that lessees should not become insurers. This court did not deem it wise 
to acquiesce in a rule whereby people would be surprised into contracts 
which neither party intended at the time of execution of the instrument... 
We cannot believe that the parties ever intended at the time of the execution 
of the lease here that the [lessee] would be burdened with an immediate 
$60,000.00 obligation for a roof and related structure by himself...to 
substantially restore the [lessor's] building by order of a public authority... 
Id. at 577 (emphasis added). Accordingly, even under the situation where a public 
authority has ordered the replacement, the identical analysis as that found above is used 
to determine whether "repair" means "replace" or "rebuild". Under either scenario, a 
duty to "repair" does not equate to a duty to "replace" or make structural improvements. 
Here, the Griffiths' contractual obligations involve the same general duties to 
"repair" as found in the cases above. "Repair" is the only such word found in Article 4 
of the lease. See R. 50 It is obvious from the rest of the lease that, had the parties 
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intended to create further obligations on the part of the Griffiths, they knew how to do so. 
For instance, "structural changes" are dealt with in Article 5, but are spoken of only in 
reference to "alterations", should the Griffiths wish to make any. R. 50. Further, in 
Article 17.5, "repairs, replacements or additions" are spoken to, but in the context of 
SLW's efforts. R. 55. SLW knew when it wanted to use the terms "replace" or 
"structural".5 However, it did not do so in the specific portion of the lease which informs 
the Griffiths of their maintenance obligations. Therefore, there is nothing in this lease 
which changes the basic principle that "repair" does not mean "replace" or "rebuild", and 
that a general duty to repair does not include a duty to make structural changes such as 
replacement of a roof. Because the trial court held that "put in repair" meant "replace", 
it therefore erred. Consequently, its grant of SLW's Motion for Summary Judgment 
should be reversed. 
At the very least, if the trial court is to interpret the word "repair" as actually to 
"replace" - something other than its ordinary and usual meaning - this finding could only 
5Section 5.1 reads, in relevant part: "Tenant may make structural changes in, on, 
to, or about the Premises, reasonably necessary for such purposes provided it has first 
obtained the written consent thereto of Landlord..." (Emphasis added.) 
Section 17.5 is the first time the lease speaks to replacements: "If the Premises are 
rendered unfit...for the uses specified in this Lease Agreement...by the making of repairs, 
replacements or additions, other than those made with Tenant's consent...there shall be a 
proportionate abatement of rent during the period of such unfitness." (Emphasis added.) 
These terms, structural and replacements, are not found in Article 4, which covers 
the Griffiths' duty to repair. 
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arise after questions of fact concerning the intent of the parties have been answered. "If 
the evidence as to the terms of an agreement is in conflict, the intent of the parties is to be 
determined by the jury." Colonial Leasing Co. v. LarsenBros. Const.. 731 P.2d 483, 488 
(Utah 1986) citing Morris v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.. 658 P.2d 1199, 1201 (Utah 
1983). As noted above, the intent of the parties as to whether "repair" meant "replace" 
is directly disputed. That this dispute was answered by the trial court in a manner contrary 
to the plain language of the lease (and the law) meant that factual disputes were improperly 
decided. "[0]n a motion for summary judgment the court may consider only facts which 
are not in dispute". Sorensonv. Beers. 585 P.2d 458, 460 (Utah 1978) (emphasis added). 
Therefore, the decision of the trial court not merely to consider these disputed facts, but 
to decide them as well, should be overturned. 
Accordingly, even if this Court does not find that, as a matter of law, the Griffiths 
are not responsible for the replacement of the roof, this Court must find that questions of 
fact exist which necessitate a trial - questions that were improperly weighed and decided 
upon a motion for summary judgment. 
B. The Various Clauses of the Lease Were Not Construed Together. 
The trial court held that, under the lease, the Griffiths had the duty to replace the 
roof, notwithstanding the surrender clause (R. 50, Lease, Section 4.2) which limited the 
Griffiths' maintenance duties. Such finding was also made without reference to Section 
17.5 of the lease - a section which contains the only mention in the lease of 
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"replacements". See R. 215, Partial Transcript of Hearing. Because the trial court did not 
properly construe these separate clauses of the lease together, its interpretation is incorrect 
as a matter of law. 
It is basic that each provision of a contract shall be considered in relation to all of 
the others with a view toward giving effect to all and ignoring none. Utah Valley Bank v. 
Tanner. 636 P.2d 1060, 1061-62 (Utah 1981). Whenever possible, different provisions of 
a contract should be construed in a manner to harmonize and give effect to all of them. 
Petition of First Interstate Bank. 767 P.2d 792, 795 (Colo. App. 1988), citing Broderick 
Wood Products Co. v. U.S., 195 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1952). Nowhere is this more 
important than a lease which limits liability through a surrender provision excepting 
"reasonable wear". Because the trial court essentially ignored this provision, as well as 
the provision concerning replacements, its interpretation was flawed as a matter of law. 
As noted by the Supreme Court of Idaho years ago, it is "axiomatic" that a lease 
should be construed to give effect to the intention of the parties. Miller v. Belknap. 266 
P.2d 662, 665 (Idaho 1954). "In so doing, the courts generally hold that covenants for 
maintenance and repair and covenants to surrender in good condition are to be construed 
together, and, so construed, the covenant to repair or to keep the premises in good 
condition, is modified by the covenant to surrender in good condition, wear and tear 
due to reasonable use excepted." Id^ . (Emphasis added.) The court went on to cite the 
general rule as regards such lease construction: 
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The general force and effect of a covenant by the lessee to make all 
repairs...is restricted and limited by a surrender clause containing an 
exception as to damage by fire and ordinary wear and tear. The two 
provisions will be construed together as imposing upon the lessee an 
obligation to make all such repairs as may be necessary for the preservation 
of the premises in the condition in which he received them from his lessor, 
except repairs required by reason of ordinary wear and tear... [which] include 
any usual deterioration from the use of the premises and by lapse of time. 
Id. at 665-66, quoting 45 A.L.R. Annot. 70, and citing King v. Richards-Cunningham 
Co.. 28 P.2d 492 (Wyo. 1934); Ball v. Wyeth. 8 Allen, Mass. 275; Judkins v. Charette. 
151 N.E. 81; Allen v.Fisher. 49 A. 477 (1901); Mills v. U.S.. 52 Ct.Cl. 452 (1917), 32 
AmJur., Landlord and Tenant, Sec. 789. Accordingly, in an action between landlord and 
tenant for property damage, the Miller Court ruled that it was error not to allow in 
evidence of the depreciation of the premises at issue which had been caused by reasonable 
wear. 266 P.2d at 666. 
The importance of interpreting such a surrender provision along with the other 
provision of the lease has been noted elsewhere, as well. In Shumv. Gaudreau. 562 A.2d 
707 (Md. 1989), the Maryland Court of Appeals stated that such a provision, along with 
a general duty to repair, does not require the tenant to build a new structure: 
At common law a tenant had a duty to keep the leased premises in repair. 
This obligated the tenant "to make ordinary repairs as distinguished 
from structural repairs or changes"...The common law duty may be 
modified by specific undertakings in a lease, but a covenant like the one 
here, involving "repairs and renovations", requires the tenant to do no more 
than that demanded by the common law duty.. .Whether the contractual duty 
to surrender the premises in good condition, except for reasonable wear and 
tear, demands more or less than a covenant to repair, the former surely does 
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not require installation of a wholly new well.. .Under the lease before us in 
this case, Tenant had no obligation to install a completely new well. 
562 A.2d at 715 (citations omitted)(emphasis added). Also see Santillanes v. Property 
Management Services. 716 P.2d 1360, 1364 (Idaho App. 1986)(Where a covenant to 
repair has been placed in a lease, "unless expressly excepted by the language of the lease, 
the lessee is not relieved from liability resulting from reasonable wear and tear or 
obsolescence".) (Emphasis added.) 
In the present case, such liability was expressly excepted by the terms of the lease. 
R.50, Lease, Section 4.2. Therefore, whatever duties were owed by the Griffiths pursuant 
to Section 4.1 of the lease (maintenance), such duties have to be read in conjunction with 
the limitations set forth in the surrender clause. The trial court did not do so. Instead, the 
trial court's interpretation of the lease renders the surrender clause superfluous, and 
phrases the lease in such a way that the Griffiths could never return the premises in good 
condition, reasonable wear excepted. R. 215. It is not debated here that the damage to 
the roof was the result of long-term rain and weather. Therefore, by definition, such 
damage was caused by reasonable wear. Although the Griffiths had attempted to repair 
such damage, the erosion and wear caused by the elements over more than a generation 
had expanded to the point where repair was no longer possible. This is the point where the 
lease, by its very terms, removes responsibility for the roof from the Griffiths. 
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As noted in a number of the "repair vs. replace" cases cited above, courts have dealt 
with leases such as that before this Court in a reasonable, equitable manner. To wit: when 
a lessee is obligated to make "repairs", subject to a "reasonable wear" surrender provision, 
it becomes evident that the parties did not intend to make the lessee an insurer of the 
property, and lessor is not entitled to a new building, better than that which he leased to 
the tenant in the first place, when damage has accrued through reasonable wear. See, e.g., 
Mobil Oil Credit Corp.. 689 S.W.2d 658, Scott v. Prazma. 555 P.2d 571, and Sandelman 
v. Buckeye Realty. Inc.. 576 N.E.2d 1038. There is no reason why the lease at issue here 
should have been interpreted any differently. 
Nevertheless, the lower court stated that the term "put in repair" did not mean to 
repair, but rather to replace, and that such duty should be imposed on the Griffiths. This 
not only ignores the surrender clause, but also ignores the fact that the parties knew how 
to address "replacements" when necessary. Proof of this is found in Section 17.5, which 
reads, in pertinent part: 
If the premises are rendered unfit in whole or in part for the uses specified 
in this Lease Agreement, for a period of more than ten days, by the making 
of repairs, replacements or additions, other than those made with Tenant1 s 
consent or caused by misuse or neglect by Tenant or Tenant's agents...there 
shall be a proportionate abatement of rent during the period of such 
unfitness. 
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R. 55, Lease (Emphasis added.) That such terminology was not used in the Article 
concerning maintenance shows that the parties never intended the Griffiths to be 
responsible for such "replacements", and that the responsibility was SLW's. 
Furthermore, there is no reason why the term "put in repair" should be interpreted 
to mean "replace, whenever damage occurs". As noted in Friedman on Leases, "[a] 
landlords covenant to 'put' premises in repair requires him to have them in a specified 
condition at the beginning of the term. It is no agreement on his part to keep them in repair 
thereafter". 1 M. Friedman, Friedman on Leases, Sec. 10.502, p.653 (3d ed. 1990). 
Indeed, even if the landlord agrees to "keep" the premises in repair, it merely means that 
the landlord must make such repairs initially, and keep them in repair thereafter. LdL6 
There is no reason why a different definition of "put in repair" should be used in reference 
to the Griffiths. Therefore, under the terms of the lease, the Griffiths were responsible to 
"put" the roof in repair at the beginning of the lease "where necessary" and maintain the 
roof thereafter, reasonable wear excepted. There is no evidence that repair of the roof was 
necessary at the beginning of the lease, and it was undisputed for the purposes of the 
motion below that the Griffiths did maintain and repair the roof throughout the term of the 
lease. However, eventually reasonable wear caught up with the premises, and rendered the 
6That this definition applies to tenants as well is suggested in a dissenting opinion 
in Sanka Classics v. Atlantic Terra Cotta Co.. 79 N.Y.S.2d 748 (N.Y. App. 1948)("But an 
agreement by the tenant to keep the premises in good repair... requires the tenant to put 
the premises in such repair in case they are not so at the time of the letting.ff), citing the 
American and English Encyclopedia of Law, vol. 18 (2d Ed) 252. (Emphasis added.) 
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roof incapable of further repair. Ultimately, the roof required replacement. The lease 
delegated no such responsibility to the Griffiths. Therefore, under this lease the Griffiths 
should not be forced to pay for a capital improvement which was not bargained for in the 
lease, and which will inure to the benefit of SLW. 
The lower court therefore erred as a matter of law in its interpretation of the lease. 
This lease, and particularly the section on maintenance, was the creature of SLW. As such, 
any ambiguity must be construed against SLW. Bonneville on the Hill Co. v. Sloane. 572 
P.2d at 403. Because the only way the trial court could have found that the lease imposed 
a duty to "replace" on the part of the Griffiths was through a construction extremely 
favorable to SLW, such interpretation should be overturned by this Court as a matter of 
law. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT IGNORED THE GRIFFITHS' EQUITABLE 
ARGUMENT 
As noted above, this Court is to liberally construe the facts, and view the evidence 
in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment. Lucky 
Seven Rodeo Corp., 755 P.2d at 752. The facts of this case, viewed in a light most 
favorable to the Griffiths, show that with only five years remaining on their lease term, the 
Griffiths were stuck with a twenty-three year-old roof - a roof whose commercial life 
expectancy elapsed three years earlier. This old roof would not last for the duration of the 
leasehold, to which the Griffiths were already committed. See R. 45,46, Affidavit of Jerry 
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W. Griffiths, Tffl 5-12. After SLW refused, the Griffiths were forced to replace the old roof, 
despite the fact that the lease did not assign this obligation to them. The roof with which 
the Griffiths ultimately replaced the existing roof will last fifteen years beyond the present 
leasehold. See R. 46, Affidavit of Jerry W. Griffiths, % 9. The Griffiths will enjoy this 
$173,900.00 expenditure for only five years, returning to SLW a building in far better 
condition than it was when leased to the Griffiths. It is inequitable that the Griffiths are 
forced to bear this expenditure. Because the trial court ignored this equitable argument, 
its grant of SLW's Motion for Summary Judgment should be reversed. 
In Utah, "[w]here courts have to choose between conflicting interpretations in the 
agreements under review, an interpretation which will bring about an equitable result will 
be preferred over a harsh or inequitable one." First Sec. Bank of Utah. N.A. v. Maxwell. 
659 P.2d 1078, 1081 (Utah 1983), citing Wingets. Inc. v. Bitters. 500 P.2d 1007 (Utah 
1972). As is evident from the various cases which have dealt with similar issues as that 
before this Court, the only equitable interpretation places the economic burden of the new 
roof on SLW. The replacement of the roof was not something contemplated by the 
agreement, and is something that will inure almost entirely to the benefit of SLW. 
In Scott v. Prazma. 555 P.2d 571, supra, a lessee contracted for the lease of a 
commercial building. The building was over 30-years old, and the roof became so run 
down that the city ordered it to be replaced. The landlord argued that the lessee was 
responsible for such replacement, due to the terms of the lease itself. Those terms stated 
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that lessor would not make any repairs, and that lessee would make such repairs, 
reasonable wear excepted. Id at 572. Nonetheless, the Wyoming Supreme Court held for 
the lessee, in part because it would be inequitable to force the lessee to make such a 
replacement: 
The lease in this case had about seven and a half years to run at the time 
[lessee] quit the premises. This is a relatively short time to justify the 
extensive repairs by the [lessee], the greater benefit of which would revert 
to the [lessor] and which are obviously inequitable and not within the 
contemplation of the parties. The [lessor] is not entitled to a remodeled 
building. 
[Lessor's] position is obviously unfair, because it would give plaintiff a 
better, fully reconstructed building than he leased, the life of which 
improvements would extend far beyond the [lessee's] remaining term of less 
than eight years. It would become far superior to its condition at the date of 
the lease. 
Id at 576, 578. 
A similar finding was made in Mobil Oil Credit Corp. v. DST Realty. Inc.. 689 
S.W.2d 658, supra. There, lessee entered into a ten-year commercial lease of a building. 
A few years after the date of the lease, it was discovered that the parking garage in the 
building needed extensive, structural repair. Although the landlord argued that the lessee 
should be responsible for such repairs, and although the lease was a "net" lease, the court 
held otherwise. A large factor in this decision was that it would be inequitable to force the 
lessee to make such extensive repairs: 
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This being a 10-year lease with rent being $350,000 and then $400,000 after 
1985, it would be unfair to make the tenant pay over $438,000, or even one 
half just to enjoy using the building until 1990. 
Id. at 661. The court then quoted from the Restatement (Second) of Property: 
Implied promise by landlord to repair. Where it would not be reasonable in 
light of the term of the lease, the rent that is being paid, the purposes for 
which the leased property is used, and other circumstances, to expect the 
tenant to assume the cost of major repairs to the leased property that become 
necessary through no fault of the tenant, a conclusion is justified that the 
landlord impliedly promised to make those major repairs. 
Id., citing Restatement (Second), Property (Landlord and Tenant) Section 5.5, comment 
f. (1977). The court went on to compare the lease to another, shorter lease dealt with by 
the New York Court of Appeals years earlier in the following manner: 
Why should the tenant pay for this? The clause of the lease did not require 
the tenant to make structural changes or to pay for rebuilding. The rent of 
the store was only $600 for a term of three years. The cost of these repairs 
or reconstruction equals within a few dollars the amount of the three years' 
rent. That such a liability was to be cast upon by the tenant by this lease 
could hardly have been within the contemplation of the parties. 
Id,, quoting United Cities Realty Corp. v. Price & Schumacher Co.. 151 N.E. 150, 151-
52 (N.Y. App. 1926). 
Citing these sources, as well as Scott v. Prazma. supra, the Mobil Oil court held 
that the landlord's position was "obviously unfair", as it would deliver to the landlord 
property far superior to its condition at the date of the lease. KL at 662, citing Restatement 
(Second), Property, Section 12.2 comment e. Therefore, as a matter of law, lessee was not 
responsible for such reconstruction. Id* 
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The same unfairness that was found in both Scott v. Prazma and Mobil Oil Credit 
Corp. is present here. However, the trial court simply ignored this, as no mention of 
equity is found in its opinion. See R. 215. With five years left on their lease, the Griffiths 
had to entirely replace this roof, as "patching was no longer feasible", and reasonable wear 
and tear over the years had taken its toll. Indeed, the Griffiths could not use the property 
for its intended - or any - purpose without such replacement. This replacement roof cost 
approximately one half of the annual rent payments being made by the Griffiths to SLW. 
Because new commercial roofs normally last for twenty years, see R. 58, Affidavit of 
Carl R. Clark \ 10, the benefit of the new roof will inure to SLW for at least 15 years 
beyond the expiration of Griffiths' lease. In fact, SLW will be receiving its property back 
in substantially better condition than it was at the beginning of the lease. 
Despite the fact that the lease said nothing as to the Griffiths' duty to replace the 
roof, the Griffiths offered to pay for one third of the cost of replacement before this 
litigation commenced. See R.46, Affidavit of Jerry Griffiths, Tffj 8-11. However, SLW 
refused this offer. IcL Despite these facts and the conflicting interpretations of the lease 
discussed above, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of SLW. 
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This is simply unfair, and inequitable. Therefore, this Court should find that, as a 
matter of law, the trial court erred in granting SLW?s Motion for Summary Judgment, and 
denying Griffiths' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. At the very least, there is a 
question of fact as to whether the equities of this case allow for SLW to reap such a 
windfall. In either event, the trial court erred, and its decision should be overturned. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should hold that the trial court's grant of SLW's Motion for Summary 
Judgment was erroneous. The trial court erred as a matter of law in the admission of 
parol evidence as to intent of the parties, as well as in the interpretation of the lease 
agreement. Alternatively, the trial court erred by granting SLW's Motion for Summary 
Judgment when genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the parties intended 
that the Griffiths would make major replacements, such as the roof, and the equities of this 
case do not favor allowing SLW to reap the windfall it has obtained. Accordingly, the 
Griffiths request that this Court reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment, 
and enter judgment in favor of the Griffiths. In the alternative, the Griffiths request that 
this Court reverse and remand, allowing the Griffiths to present their case to the fact 
finder. 
37 
& DATED this J ^ j d a y of January, 1998. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
Jeffrey L/Silvestrini 
Attorney for Appellants 
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50 West Broadway, #700 
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ADDENDUM 
Exhibit "A": Court's Order dated May 15, 1997 
Exhibit "B": Lease Agreement 
JOSEPH C. RUST (2835) 
KESLER & RUST 
2000 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-8000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 








Civil No. 960902644PR 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, having come on for hearing before the Honorable Judge Anne M. Stirba on the 18th day 
of April, 1997, at the hour of 8:30 a.m., and Plaintiff being represented by Joseph C. Rust and 
Defendants being represented by Jeffrey L. Silvestrini, and the Court having reviewed the 
memoranda and affidavits submitted in the case, and the Court having heard the arguments of 
counsel, and the Court having determined that the lease at issue was an integrated contract and that 
Article 4 of the lease contained the critical language for the determination of the case, and the Court 
having found that that language was unambiguous, and the Court further having found that it could 
EXHIBIT 
Third Judicial Distr, 
MAY, 1 5 W 
give a fair meaning to all of the terms in the lease and particularly Article 4, without rendering any 
lease provision meaningless or inconsistent with other provisions, and the Court further having 
determined that the language in Article 4, which says "put into repair where necessary" had a 
meaning different from the immediately preceding language calling for the tenant to maintain and 
keep in repair the roof of the building, and the Court having determined that "put into repair" had 
the meaning of replacing, and for other good cause appearing, 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED AS 
FOLLOWS: 
1. Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
2. Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is denied. 
3. With the express reservation of issues yet remaining in the case, specifically issues 
relative to costs and attorneys fees, this matter is certified as a Rule 54(b) final judgment, there being 
no reason for delay as to the final effect of the ruling granted herein. 
DATED this A^L day of May, 1997. ^ - ^ ~ .. 
BY THE COURT 
HONORABLE JUDGE ANNE STIRBA ~ J-
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby declare that I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of ORDER in Civil No. 
960902644PR, postage prepaid, this 1-^day of May, 1997, to: 
Jeffrey L. Silvestrini 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
525 East 1st South, 5th Floor 
PO BOX 1008 






Agreement of lease, made May 12 , i906, between 
SLW PROPERTIES, by I.C.A. & ASSOCIATES, INC., Managing 
Agent ("Landlord"), having it's office at 1300 Nortli McClintock 
Drive, Chandler, AZ 85224 and Jerry W. Griffiths and Juna E. 
Griffiths ("Tenant"), both residents whose address is 924 
East Osmond Lane, Provo, Utah 84604. 
WITNESSETH: 
ARTICLE 1 
Premises and Term 
1•1 Premises. Landlord leases to Tenant and Tenant 
takes from Landlord the following: 
(a) the real property and improvements more fully 
described on Exhibit "A" and to be known by the street 
address 389 and 391 Orange Street, Salt Lake city, Utah, 
84104; and 
(b) all the equipment, fixtures, furnishings, design, 
decor, decorations, installations, appurtenances, and personal 
property located on such property, all of the foregoing being 
the "Premises". 
1.2 Commencement and Term. The Term of this Lease 
Agreement shall commence the 1st ^ay of June, 198.6 • Such 
date is hereinafter called the "Commencement Date". The term 




2.1 Dase Rent. Tenant shall pay to Landlord, at 
Landlord's last notified address, an annual Base Rent of 
$ 3 5 2,479.00 payable in equal monthly Installments, in 
advance, on the first day of each calendar month during the 
i J f teen year term. Tenant's obligation to pay the llaso Rent 
shall be deemed in default if any monthly installment is not 
received by Landlord on or before the tenth (10th) day of the 
month in which it is due, and Tenant sha1 I pay Landlord 
interest thereon at a per annum rate of fifteen percent (151) 
from the first day of the month for which such Base Rent is 
due and payable. 
2.2 Adjustment to Base Rent. The Base Rent shall be 
adjusted on the first day of January, 1989, and on January 
1st of each successive three year period thereafter during 
the term of this Lease Agreement to equal the sum of (i) the 
annnual Base Rent of $ 352,479.00 above plus (ii) fifty 
percent (50%) of the product obtained by multiplying said 
annual Base Rent of $ 352.479.00 by the percentage increase, 
if any, in the Consumer Price Index on the day such adjust-
ment to Base Rent is made over the Consumer Price Index on 
January 1, 1986. As used in this Agreement "Consumer Price 
Index" shall mean the Consumer Price Index for All Urban 
Consumers, U.S. City Average, All Items, Base 1967 = 100, 
issued by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United States 
Department of Labor. If the Index shall hereafter be 
converted to a different standard reference base or other-
wise revised, the determination of the percentage increase 
shall be made with the use of such conversion factor, formula 
or table for converting the Index as may be published by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, or if said Bureau shall not 
publish the same, then with the use of such conversion 
p u b l i s h e d by any n a t i o n a l l y r e c o g n i z e d p u b l i s h e r of s i m i l a r 
s t a t i s t i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n . In t h e e v e n t t h e Index s h a l L c o a s o 
t o be p u b l i s h e d , t h e p a r t i e s h e r e t o a g r e e f o r p u r p o s e s of 
t h i s L e a s e , t o r e p l a c e t h e C o n s u m e r P r i c e Index w i t h a 
r e a s o n a b l e s u b s t i t u t e used by L a n d l o r d s and T e n a n t s in Lhe 
S t a t e o f U t a h . I n no e v e n t w i l l B a s e Rent be l e s s than 
$ 3 5 2 , 4 7 9 . 0 0 . 
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• ^ Real E s t a t e T a x e s 
( a ) T e n a n t s h a l l pay a l l r e a l e s t a t e t a x e s l e v i e d 
a g a i n s t o r a p p o r t i o n e d t o t h e P r e m i s e s when d u e . For t h e s e 
p u r p o s e s , " r e a l e s t a t e t a x e s " s h a l l mean t h e sum of ( i ) a l l 
r e a l e s t a t e t a x e s and a s s s e s s m e n t s ( i n c l u d i n g , h o w e v e r , o n l y 
t h o s e s p e c i a l a s s e s s m e n t s a t t a c h i n g s u b s e q u e n t t o t h e 
C o m m e n c e m e n t D a t e i m p o s e d by a n y g o v e r n m e n t a l b o d i e s or 
a u t h o r i t i e s u p o n o r a g a i n s t t h e P r e m i s e s ) p l u s ( i i ) t h e 
a m o u n t o f s u c h t a x e s l e v i e d or a s s e s s e d upon or a g a i n s t t h e 
l a n d d e s c r i b e d i n E x h i b i t A a t t a c h e d h e r e t o a n d a n y 
improvements t h e r e t o . ' 
( b ) I n a d d i t i o n t o R e a l E s t a t e T a x e s , Tenant 
s h a l l b e r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a n d s h a l l pay t o t h e a s s e s s i n g 
g o v e r n m e n t a l a g e n c y , b e f o r e d e l i n q u e n c y , a l l m u n i c i p a l , 
c o u n t y or s t a t e t a x e s a s s e s s e d d u r i n g t h e l e a s e term a g a i n s t 
a n y s u b l e a s e h o l d i n t e r e s t or p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y of any k ind 
owned by or p l a c e d i n , upon or a b o u t t h e P r e m i s e s by T e n a n t . 
( c ) L a n d l o r d o r T e n a n t s h a l l havo t h e r i g h t t o 
c o n t e s t a n y i n c r e a s e i n r e a l e s t a t e t a x e s . Any r e a s o n a b l e 
e x p e n s e s o i n c u r r e d s h a l l be p a i d by T e n a n t . 
( d ) I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h i s 
P a r a g r a p h , Tenant a g r e e s t o pay any t a x a s s e s s e d i n a d d i t i o n 
t o o r i n l i e u o f t h e ad v a l o r e m t a x e s p r e s e n t l y a s s e s s e d , 
w h i c h may b e a s s e s s e d , l e v i e d o r i m p o s e d a g a i n s t t h e 
P r e m i s e s a n d / o r a n y r e n t t a x a s s e s s a b l e a g a i n s t r e n t , a s 
s u c h , t h a t may b e c h a r g e d , l e v i e d , a s s e s s e d or imposed in 
l i e u o f or i n a d d i t i o n t o r e a l e s t a t e t a x e s d e s c r i b e d a b o v e , 
on t h e d a t e t h a t s u c h t a x i s p a y a b l e t o t h e g o v e r n m e n t a l 
a g e n c y a s s e s s i n g t h e same. Copy of t a x n o t i c e w i l l be s e n t 
t o t e n a n t w i t h i n f i v e d a y s a f t e r r e c e i p t of same . 
2 . 4 C u r i n g P a s t Due O b l i g a t i o n s . I n a d d i t i o n t o 
t h e B a s e R e n t p r o v i d e d a b o v e , i f Landlord s h a l l i n c u r any 
e x p e n s e o r p a y a n y m o n i e s i n c o r r e c t i n g o r c u r i n g any 
v i o l a t i o n o f a c o v e n a n t or o b l i g a t i o n by T e n a n t , t h e amount 
s o p a i d o r i n c u r r e d s h a l l , a t L a n d l o r d ' s o p t i o n , and on t e n 
( 1 0 ) d a y s w r i t t e n n o t i c e t o T e n a n t , be p a y a b l e by T e n a n t 
t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e n e x t i n s t a l l m e n t of Base Rent coming due 
and p a y a b l e , a n d s u c h Rent may be c o l l e c t e d or e n f o r c e d in 
t h e same manner i n r e s p e c t t o t h e Base R e n t . 
ARTICLE 3 
Use and Signs 
3 - 1 U s e . T e n a n t w i l l n o t u s e or occupy t h e P r e m i s e s 
f o r a n y u n l a w f u l , d i s o r d e r l y , or h a z a r d o u s p u r p o s e . Tenant 
s h a l l c o m p l y w i t h a l l p r e s e n t and f u t u r e l a w s , o r d i n a n c e s , 
r e g u l a t i o n s a n d o r d e r s o f a l l g o v e r n m e n t a l a u t h o r i t i e s 
h a v i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e p r e m i s e s . 
3 . 2 S i g n s ._ T e n a n t s h a l l i n d e m n i f y and s a v e h a r m l e s s 
L a n d l o r d a g a i n s t a n d f r o m a n y a n d a l l l o s s e s , d a m a g e s , 
c l a i m s , s u i t s , or a c t i o n s f o r any i n j u r y or damage t o p e r s o n 
o r p r o p e r t y c a u s e d by t h e e r e c t i o n and m a i n t e n a n c e of any 
s i g n s . 
ARTICLE 4 
Care and Repair of P r e m i s e s 
4 « l M a i n t e n a n c e . T e n a n t s h a l l commit no w a s t e and 
s h a l l t a k e g o o d c i r e o f the P r e m i s e s and make a l l r e p a i r s 
n e c e s s i t a t e d by T e n a n t ' s m i s u s e ofc t h e P r e m i s e s . Tenant 
s h a l l m a i n t a i n and keep i n r e p a i r t h e p l u m b i n g , e l e c t r i c a l 
and h e a t i n g , v e n t i l a t i o n and a i r c o n d i t i o n i n g s y s t e m s and 
t h e e q u i p m e n t , f i x t u r e s , a p p u r t e n a n c e s t o s a i d s y s t e m s , and 
o t h e r i n s t a l l a t i o n s s e r v i c i n g more than one t e n a n t of t h e 
b u i l d i n g . I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e a b o v e , Tenant s h a l l m a i n t a i n 
a n d k e e p i n r e p a i r ( a n d s h a l l p u t i n t o r e p a i r w h e r e 
n e c e s s a r y ) t h e w a l l s and roof of t h e b u i l d i n g of which t h e 
P r e m i s e s f o r m a p a r t and t h e s i d e w a l k s in f r o n t t h e r e o f and 




 P r e m i s e s - E n d o f L e a s e . T h e P r e m i s e s s h a l l be 
s u r r e n d e r e d t o L a n d l o r d a t the end of t h e term i n as good 
c o n d i t i o n as i t was
 tat t h e b e g i n n i n g of t h e t e r m , r e a s o n a b l e 
wear e x c e p t e d . 
ARTICLE 5 
Alterations 
5 . 1 T e n a n t s h a l l have t h e r i g h t , a t T e n a n t ' s e x p e n s e , 
f r o m t i m e t o t i m e , w i t h o u t L a n d l o r d ' s c o n s e n t , t o r e d e c o r a t e 
t h e P r e m i s e s , a n d t o make such n o n - s t r u c t u r a l a l t e r a t i o n s , 
c h a n g e s , i n s t a l l a t i o n s , a d d i t i o n s , o r i m p r o v e m e n t s 
( c o l l e c t i v e l y " c h a n g e s " ) i n , o n , t o , or a b o u t such p a r t s 
t h e r e o f a s i t s h a l l d e e m e x p e d i e n t o r n e c e s s a r y for i t s 
p u r p o s e s o f i t s s u b t e n a n t s and l i c e n s e e s . Tenant may make 
s t r u c t u r a l c h a n g e s i n , o n , t o , o r a b o u t t h e P r e m i s e s , 
r e a s o n a b l y n e c e s s a r y f o r such p u r p o s e s p r o v i d e d i t has f i r s t 
o b t a i n e d t h e w r i t t e n c o n s e n t t h e r e t o of L a n d l o r d , Landlord 
a g r e e i n g t h a t i t s h a l l n o t w i t h h o l d or d e l a y such c o n s e n t 
u n r e a s o n a b l y . 
ARTICLE 6 
A s s i g n m e n t s & S u b l e t t i n g 
^ • i Asj^i_gnmer^t1 S u b l e a s e « T e n a n t s h a l l h a v e t h e 
r i g h t , w i t h L a n d l o r d ' s w r i t t e n c o n s e n t , t o a s s i g n t h i s Lease 
A g r e e m e n t o r t o s u b l e t t h e P r e m i s e s or any p a r t t h e r e o f for 
t h e u s e s h e r e i n s p e c i f i e d p r o v i d e d t h a t such a s s i g n m e n t s or 
s u b l e a s i n g s h a l l n o t e x c e e d t h e t e r m o f t h i s L e a s e 
Agreement . 
6 . 2 AiLsum.E!LL2i! 2L^  L e a s e . I f t h i s L e a s e Agreement i s 
a s s i g n e d o r T f t h e P r e m i s e s or any p a r t t h e r e o f i s s u b l e t , 
s u c h a s s i g n m e n t o r s u b l e t t i n g s h a l l be upon and s u b j e c t to 
a l l of t h e t e r m s , c b v e n a n t s , and c o n d i t i o n s c o n t a i n e d in 
t h i s L e a s e A g r e e m e n t , and Tenant s h a l l c o n t i n u e t o remain 
l i a b l e t h e r e u n d e r . Upon any s u b s e q u e n t a s s i g n m e n t , each 
s u b s e q u e n t a s s i g n e e s h a l l c o n t i n u e t o be and remain l i a b l e 
h e r e u n d e r . W i t h i n 30 d a y s a f t e r t h e e x e c u t i o n and d e l i v e r y 
o f a n y s u c h a s s i g n m e n t Tenant s h a l l f u r n i s h t o Landlord a 
d u p l i c a t e o r i g i n a l of t h e a s s i g n m e n t which s h a l l c o n t a i n an 
a s s u m p t i o n by t h e a s s i g n e e o f a l l o f t h e o b l i g a t i o n s of 
Tenant under t h i s Lease Agreement . 
ARTICLE 7 
Mortgages of T e n a n t ' s I n t e r e s t 
7
- l S u b o r d i na t e d L e a s e h o l d M o r t g a g e . T e n a n t , and 
i t s s u c c e s s o r s a n d a s s i g n s , s h a l l not m o r t g a g e or p l e d g e 
t h i s Lease Agreement w i t h o u t t h e p r i o r a p p r o v a l of L a n d l o r d . 
With such a p p r o v a l such mortgage or p l e d g e s h a l l be s u b j e c t 




«1 Landlord Services. Landlord shall not be required to 
furnish Tenant with any services and Tenant shall be fully respon-
sible for any such services including heating, water, air condition-




•1 Indemnity. After the Commencement Date Tenant shall 
indemnify and hold harmless Landlord against and from any and all 
liabilities, fines, suits, claims, demands, and actions, and costs 
and reasonable expenses of any kind or nature or by anyone whomso-
ever, due to or arising out of (a) any default in observing, viola-
tion, or nonperformance of any term, covenants, or condition of this 
Lease Agreement on the part of Tenant to be observed and performed, 
and/or (b) any damage to persons or property occasioned by Tenant's 
use and occupancy of the Premises or to any use or occupancy which 
Tenant may permit or suffer to be made of the Premises, and/or (c) 
any injury to person or persons, Including death resulting at any 
time therefrom, occurring on leased Premises. 
9.2 Liability Insurance. During the term of this Lease Agree-
ment, tenant, at its sole cost and expense and for the mutual benefit 
of Landlord and Tenant, shall carry and maintain comprehensive 
public liability Insurance, including property damage, insuring 
Landlord and Tenant against liability for injury to persons or 
property occurring in or about the Premises or arising out of the 
ownership, maintenance, use, or occupancy thereof, to the limit of 
not less than $500,000 for any once accident or occurance and so called, 
"umbrella" or "excess" coverage therefor to the limit of not less than 
$2,000,000. On the Commencement Date Tenant shall furnish to Landlord 
copies or certificates of said policies together with proof of payment 
of the premium therefor, and shall upon the expiration of the term 
of any such poiicy similarly furnish to Landlord a copy or certificate 
of each such renewal policy together with proof of payment of the 
premium therefor. Said policy and each renewal thereof shall provide 
that the same may not be cancelled by the insurer without ten days1 
prior written notice to Landlord and to Tenant. 
9.3 Waiver of Subrogation. Notwithstanding any provision of 
this Lease Agreement to the contrary, in the event of loss or damage 
LD the building, the Premises and/or any contents, each pariy shall 
look first to any insurance in its favor before making any claim 
against the other party; and to the extent possible without addi-
tional cost, each party shall obtain, for each policy of such insur-
ance, provisions permitting waiver of any claim against the other 
paity for loss or damage within the scope of the insurance, and 
each party, to such extent permitted, for itself and its insurers 
waives all such insured claims against the other party. 
ARTICLE 3 0 
Fire Insurance 
10.1 Fire Insurance. During the term of this Lease Agreement 
Tenant shall, at Tenant's cost and expense and for the benefit of 
Landlord and any Mortgagee of the property, insure the leased build-
ing, together with all appurtenances thereto, against damage and 
destruction by fire, including extended coverage and all other perils 
for the full replacement cost of said building. tenant shall not be 
liable to Landlord for any damage or destruction covered by such 
insurance, and Landlord will look solely to the insurer or any third 
party against which it may have a claim. Tenant shall cause such 
Insurance to be written so as to provide that insurers waive all 
right of recovery by way of subrogation against the Tenant. 
ARTICLE 11 
Eminent Domain 
1 1 . 1 Ma t e r i a 1 C o n d e m n a t i o n . I f t h e P r e m i s e s or any 
p a r t t h e r e o f or any e s t a t e t h e r e i n , or any o t h e r p a r t of 
t h e b u i l d i n g o f w h i c h t h e P r e m i s e s form a p a r t m a t e r i a l l y 
a f f e c t i n g T e n a n t ' s u s e of t h e P r e m i s e s , be t a k e n by v i r t u e 
o f e m i n e n t d o m a i n , t h i s L e a s e Agreement s h a l l t e r m i n a t e on 
t h e d a t e when t i t l e v e s t s p u r s u a n t t o such t a k i n g , t h e Rent 
s h a l l b e a p p o r t i o n e d as of s a i d d a t e and any Rent p a i d f o r 
any p e r i o d beyond s a i d d a t e s h a l l be r e p a i d t o T e n a n t . 
1 1 . 2 L a n d l q r d ' s A w a r d , T e n a n t ' s S h a r e . Tenant s h a l l 
n o t b e e n t i t l e d t o a n y p a r t o f t h e a w a r d , e x c e p t t h a t 
L a n d l o r d s h a l l p a y t o L e s s e e from t h e award when r e c e i v e d 
t h e a m o u n t , i f a n y , by w h i c h i t i s i n c r e a s e d by r e a s o n of 
t h e t a k i n g of f i x t u r e s and equipment which Tenant i s 
e n t i t l e d t o r e m o v e , o r by r e a s o n o f a l t e r a t i o n s a n d 
i m p r o v e m e n t s p a i d for by T e n a n t , or by r e a s o n of t h e c o s t t o 
Tenant of moving from t h e P r e m i s e s and r e l o c a t i n g . 
ARTICLE 12 
S u b o r d i n a t i o n 
1 2 . 1 S u b o r d i n a t i on , N o n d i s t u r b a n c e Agreement^ T h i s 
L e a s e A g r e e m e n t s h a l l b e s u b j e c t a n d s u b o r d i n a t e t o 
m o r t g a g e s w h i c h now a f f e c t t h e r e a l p r o p e r t y of which t h e 
P r e m i s e s f o r m a p a r t a n d t o a l l r e n e w a l s , m o d i f i c a t i o n s , 
c o n s o l i d a t i o n s , and r e p l a c e m e n t s of s a i d p r e s e n t l y e x i s t i n g 
m o r t g a g e s . 
1 2 . 2 F u t u r e M o r t g a g e s . T e n a n t f u r t h e r a g r e e s t h a t 
t h i s L e a s e A g r e e m e n t s h a l l a l s o be s u b j e c t and s u b o r d i n a t e 
t o any f u t u r e mor tgage h e l d by a l e n d i n g i n s t i t u t i o n , which 
may h e r e a f t e r a f f e c t s a i d r e a l p r o p e r t y and t o a l l r e n e w a l s , 
m o d i f i c a t i o n s , c o n s o l i d a t i o n s , and r e p l a c e m e n t s t h e r e o f . 
1 2 . 3 S u b o r d i n a t i o n Agreement . A l t h o u g h no i n s t r u m e n t 
o r a c t o n t h e p a r t o f T e n a n t s h a l l b e n e c e s s a r y t o 
e f f e c t u a t e s a i d s u b o r d i n a t i o n , Tenant w i l l , n e v e r t h e l e s s , 
e x e c u t e and d e l i v e r such f u r t h e r i n s t r u m e n t s c o n f i r m i n g such 
s u b o r d i n a t i o n of t h i s Lease Agreement on t h e t erms a f o r e s a i d 
a s may b e d e s i r e d by t h e h o l d e r s of such m o r t g a g e s . Tenant 
h e r e b y a p p o i n t s Landlord a t t o r n e y i n f a c t , i r r e v o c a b l y , t o 
e x e c u t e a n d d e l i v e r any such i n s t r u m e n t s f o r Tenant s h o u l d 
T e n a n t f a i l or r e f u s e w i t h i n a r e a s o n a b l e t i m e a f t e r r e q u e s t 
t o do s o . 
ARTICLE 13 
D e f a u l t — Remedies 
1 3 . 1 D e f a u l t , N o t i c e , T e r m i n a t i o n . I f T e n a n t 
d e f a u l t s T~n t h e p a y m e n t o f R e n t o r d e f a u l t s i n t h e 
p e r f o r m a n c e of any of t h e t e r m s , c o v e n a n t s , or c o n d i t i o n s of 
t h i s L e a s e A g r e e m e n t , L a n d l o r d may g i v e t o Tenant w r i t t e n 
n o t i c e of such d e f a u l t , and i f Tenant d o e s no t c u r e any Rent 
d e f a u l t w i t h i n 15 d a y s , o r o t h e r d e f a u l t w i t h i n 3 0 d a y s , 
a f t e r t h e g i v i n g o f such n o t i c e ( o r , i f s u c h o t h e r d e f a u l t 
i s o f s u c h n a t u r e t h a t i t c a n n o t be c o m p l e t e l y c u r e d w i t h i n 
s u c h 3 0 d a y s , i f Tenant d o e s n o t commence such c u r i n g w i t h i n 
s u c h 3 0 d a y s and t h e r e a f t e r p r o c e e d w i t h r e a s o n a b l e 
d i l i g e n c e a n d i n g o o d f a i t h t o c u r e such d e f a u l t ) , then 
L a n d l o r d may t e r m i n a t e t h i s L e a s e Agreement on not l e s s than 
s e v e n d a y s ' w r i t t e n n o t i c e t o T e n a n t , a n d on t h e d a t e 
s p e c i f i e d i n s a i d n o t i c e t h e term of t h i s L e a s e Agreement 
s h a l l t e r m i n a t e , a n d T e n a n t s h a l l then q u i t and s u r r e n d e r 
t h e P r e m i s e s t o L a n d l o r d , but Tenant s h a l l remain l i a b l e as 
h e r e i n a f t e r p r o v i d e d . I f L e a s e Agreement s h a l l have been s o 
I: e r HI i tin I: ed hy Land lor d , L a n d l o r d may at. any I i mo I hoi na f I or 
r e s u m e pos s o s s i on ol.* I: ho P iomisos hy '"my l a w f u l means nnd 
i.omovp Tenant and o t h e r occupants and I Imi r e f f e c t s . 
I \.Z l l e p o s s or, s i_c> t» , r o l c t t i j i q . I n a n y e a s e w l m r o 
L a n d l o r d has r e c o v e r e d possess i on of I ho l*i omi sos by IP. I . 'JOU 
o f T o n a n l ' s d e f a u l t L a n d l o i d may a l hand lot d • s opl ion occupy 
t h e p i . o m i s p s o r c a n H O U I P p r o m i s o r , I
 ( ) ho l e d o c o r a l e d , 
a I I o r od , il i v i I ICMI , o r o l . l i r i wi:;r» o h a n q od 01 pi opa t od f u i 
i o I »' I I i iH.j , and may r e l e t . I.ho pi emi sos or any |>.n I t h o i o o f as 
m p ' i i l o l T o n a n l or o h h o t w i s o f o r a h*i m or I 01 in?; l o oxpi i o 
p» i o r I. o , ah I. ho samp I: i mo a s , o l s u b s p i | U ' » u l I n , I. he* 
0 i i q i it a I ox p i r a I i on d a I. o o I* I h i s I. oa s o A <| » oemo n I , a I 
L a n d l o r d ' s o p l . i o n , and r e c e i v e I ho r e n t l l i n m l o r , a p p l y i n q 
1 ho same f i i. s t l o 1 ho payment of such oxjuMiruv; as L a n d l o r d 
m a y ha v o i n c u r r e d i n C O I I I I P C I . i o n w i I h I h o i I M - O v o i y o f 
l»Msr»nfi:; 'ui i i f : , r ode< or a t i nq , a I I ot i nq , < I i v i <H nq , m ol h»i w i .•;o 
c h a ii c| i ii q o i p r op a r i nq f o r i o I o I I i n q a n d I l ie i o I ol I i nq , 
i M I : I ml i m j h i o k o r a q o and r e a s o n a b l e l o q a l l'v>r,, and I lion t o 
I. h o p a y m e n t ' , o l d a m a q o s i n amount s q q u a l l o I.ho i o n l 
h e r e u n d e r a n d I l ie c o s t a n d e x p e n s e of poi fo imnuco <d I. Iio 
0 I; h o r c;o v pn a n I. s o f T o n a n l . as Ii r» i r* i. n p r o v i d e d ; and Tenant 
a q i O P S , w h p l h o i o r nol . L a n d I o l d h a s i e I p I , ho p a y l o 
L a n d l o r d d ama q P S e q u a l l o I ho lent , and ol.hei sum.s h e r o i n 
a q r o o d l o l ip p a i d hy T e n a n t , lor;?; I ho not. p i o c o o d s of I ho 
r o I o I. I i nq , i l a n y , as a s c o i t a i u p d Mom I imp Lo I imp, and I ho 
same: s h a l I ho p a y a l ) l p hy T o n a n l on I ho s o v e i a I t o n ! days 
a b o v e s p o e i L i e d . I n r e l e t t i n g I ho P iomisos as a f o r e s a i d , 
L a n d l o c d may qi ant r o u t c o n c e s s i o n s , and .Tenant s h a l l nol bo 
c r e d i t e d t h e r e w i t h . Ho such re l.pl I. i n»| s h a l l c o n s t i t u t e a 
j i H r r n n i l n r a m i a c c e p t a n c e or l»p deemed e v i d e n c e I hoi oof . I f 
L a n d I o l d o I o r i s , pursuant. h e r o i n , a c t u a l l y l o occupy and use 
M I P P t r» iti i s P S oi. a n y p a r t . t h e r e o f d m inq any p a i l , of t h e 
b a l a n c e o f Lhp I. or iu as o r i g i n a l l y f i x e d oi s i n c e e x t e n d e d , 
1 h e r o n h a l I bp a I I owed a q a i n s t Tenant ' s o b l i g a t i o n f o r r e n t 
o r d a m a q o .s a s h o r p i n d p f i t i p d , d n i i n q L h e p e r i o d ol' 
L a n d l o r d ' s o c c u p a n c y , I. h o I on s on a l» I o va I u o o f .such 
o c c u p a n c y , no l . l o o x o o o d i n a n y e v e n t I h o r o u t , h e r o i n 
l o s o r v o d , a n d s u c h o c c u p a n c y s h a l l nol hp const i nod as a 
i p l e a s o of Tonanl ' s l i a b i l i t y h e r e u n d e r . 
1 3 . 3 l i c c i n i I y f o r P e r f o r m a n c e of Loaso . In add i t ion 
I o Lhp o t h e r r e m e d i e s s o t f «i t i. h in t.iii.s I.pa.so A'M" PPIHPIII". , 
T p n a i i t f u i" I: h o r a q r e o s t o r a v j u r o I ho p n Idr in . inc" (>l th i f * 
Loa.so A' f rpoi i tP i i t l>y dopos.i l i 11«f wi l.h huyor I he Nol os anil any 
T r u s t . H o o d s r o l a l inn. LhcMolo , fTopier; of vdiirrh ; i i " at.t achoil 
h o i e l . o as Kxhi . h i t . " l l M r w i t h Lhp h a n d h i i d undpr t h i s Leaso 
A (| r e o m e n L a s c o I. l a t e r a I s e c u r i I. y I o r t h o I a i I h l u I 
poi ; f o r ma nee of I ho Loim.s, covonant s , and »:oiid i I ions l .horpof 
hy t t ie h e s s e e . .Such d e p o s i t s h a l l he made hy an approp i i a l o 
a s s i c M i m e n l . o f rsuch Mcil'.pn a n d a n y T i u s t H o o d s r e l a L i n q 
I h e r o l . o l.o L h e L a n d l o r d w h i c h s h a l l , amoiirj ol hor t h i n / i s , 
r o c i l o U i n l s u c h ;i s .s i tj n mruil. is rui ly a s o o u r i l y undcM surrh 
l . o a s o . .Such o r i « | i u a l M ti I c» f. a n d T i n s i D o o d a n d a R e -
q u e s t For F u l l Deed o f Reconveyance o f such T r u s t Deed s h a l l 
ho h o l d i n o s c i ow hy I ho T i t l e Company f o r I.ho Land lot d and 
. s h a l l no l ; he s u r r e n d e r e d hy .such P S C I O W a<f on I. l.o I ho 
L a n d l o r d o x c p p l . upon an a f f i d a v i t hy I I i " Laud lot d tha i t.ho 
l .osr .np is in d p f a u l l and has IJPPI I ov i c l o d * I i oin t h e P tP in isos . 
T h e or, i; row a < j o n t s h a l I n o t he I i a h l o l o r any a c t pxcopl 
I r a m i c> r m a I f e a s a u c e i n t h e p x p i e i s p o f t h e e s c r o w 
oh I i qal . i on:; . 
U p o n t h e I. e s s e e ' s d e f a u I I. a n d e v i c t i o n f r um t h e 
p r e m i s e s hy r e a s o n of such d e f a n l l , l h e Land lot d s h a l l have 
t h e o p ' * nn o i t h o i : ( I ) l.o fil.TfSot any payments due Lessee 
hy L e s s o r u n d e r t h e tonus of the Purehaso Aqreoment. hetwoon 
I ho P a r t i e s h o r o l ( j w h o r e i n hes.sor pi irchnr.pd f rom L P S S P P I . I IP 
I ' l e m i s e s l e a s e d p u r s u a n t t o t h i s hoar .p Aqreompnt by any 
a m o u n t s d u e a n d not: p a i d hy L P S S P P p u r s u a n t t o t h i n J.paso 
A q r o p i i i p n t ; ov {?.) t o s e l l such s e c u r i t y ( e o n s i s t i n q oT such 
N o 1: es a n d a n y T r u s t Deod s r o 1 a I: i n q t h o r e t o w l i i c h a r e 
a t t a c h e d as E x h i b i t MDM) in accordance with the p r o v i s i o n s 
of t h e l a w s of t h e S t a t e of U t a h , on due n o t i c e to the 
L e s s e e or any o t h e r owner of such Notes and any Trust Deed 
r e l a t i n g there to who has n o t i f i e d the Landlord in wri t ing of 
h i s ownership , and the monies r e a l i z e d on such s a l e s h a l l be 
a p p l i e d to cure any de fau l t e x i s t i n g under the terms of such 
l e a s e and any balance remaining s h a l l be paid to the Lessee 
or o t h e r owner thereof; or (3) to dec lare such Notes and any 
T r u s t Deeds, by i t s terms, s a t i s f i e d and c a n c e l l e d , in which 
e v e n t a l l o b l i g a t i o n s thereunder s h a l l cease and terminate , 
and t h e L a n d l o r d s h a l l have the r ight to execute a formal 
s a t i s f a c t i o n t h e r e o f a n d c a u s e such N o t e s and any 
r e c o n v e y a n c e o f T r u s t Deeds t o be d e l i v e r e d t o t h e 
a p p r o p r i a t e a u t h o r i t y f o r c a n c e l l a t i o n , and s u c h 
s a t i s f a c t i o n and c a n c e l l a t i o n s h a l l be deemed a reduction in 
the purchase pr ice of the Premises and not a p e n a l t y . 
Dur ing t h e p e r i o d in which such Note and any r e l a t i n g 
T r u s t Deeds a r e h e l d as such s e c u r i t y , a l l payments of 
i n t e r e s t on s u c h Note s h a l l be paid to ,the tenant or other 
h o l d e r thereof . In the event of a d e f a u l t in the payment of 
s u c h i n t e r e s t f o r t w e n t y ( 2 0 ) d a y s a f t e r wr i t ten n o t i c e 
t h e r e o f , by r e g i s t e r e d or c e r t i f i e d mai l , to the Landlord, 
t h e e s c r o w h o l d e r s h a l l d e l i v e r such Note and any r e l a t i n g 
T r u s t Deed and the assignment thereof to the tenant or other 
h o l d e r t h e r e o f . In such event , such Note and any r e l a t i n g 
T r u s t Deed s h a l l cease to be s e c u r i t y for the performance of 
the terms, covenants , and cond i t ions of such l e a s e . 
1 3 . 4 L a n d l o r d ' s Cure of Tenant's De fau l t . If Tenant 
b r e a c h e s any t e r m , c o v e n a n t , or condTETon of t h i s Lease 
Agreement on Tenant's part to be performed, Landlord may, on 
r e a s o n a b l e n o t i c e to Tenant (except that no n o t i c e need be 
g i v e n in case of emergency), cure such breach at the expense 
o f T e n a n t and t h e r e a s o n a b l e amount of a l l e x p e n s e , 
i n c l u d i n g l e g a l f e e s , incurred by Landlord in doing so s h a l l 
be payable on demand to Landlord. 
ARTICLE 14 
Notices 
1 4 . 1 Any n o t i c e , d e m a n d , r e q u e s t , o r o t h e r 
communicat ion hereunder given or made by e i t h e r party to the 
o t h e r s h a l l be in w r i t i n g and s h a l l be deemed to be duly 
g i v e n o n l y i f m a i l e d by r e g i s t e r e d or c e r t i f i e d mail in a 
postpaid envelope addressed as f o l l o w s : 
( a ) i f t o Tenant, at Tenant's address f i r s t above s e t 
forth with a copy a t the Premises , and 
(b) i f t o Landlord, at Landlord's address f i r s t above 
s e t f o r t h , 
o r a t s u c h o t h e r a d d r e s s e s as Tenant or L a n d l o r d , 
r e s p e c t i v e l y , may d e s i g n a t e in wr i t ing By n o t i c e pursuant to 
t h i s A r t i c l e 1 4 . 1 . 
ARTICLE 15 
Broker 
1 5 . 1 The p a r t i e s h e r e t o r e p r e s e n t and warrant that 
t h e r e a r e no c o m m i s s i o n s or other f e e s in connect ion with 
t h i s Lease Agreement. 
ARTICLE 16 
Quiet Enjoyment 
1 6 . 1 Q u i e t Enjoyment . Landlord covenants that i f and 
s o l o n g as Tenant p a y s t h e r e n t and performs the terms, 
c o v e n a n t s , and cond i t i on s on Tenant's part to be performed, 
T e n a n t s h a l l p e a c e a b l y and q u i t e l y h a v e , h o l d and e n j o y t h e 
P r e m i s e s f o r t h e t e r m o f t h i s I .ease Agreement , s u b j e c t t o 
t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s Lease A g r e e m e n t . 
1 6 . 2 T i t l e W a r r a n t y . L a n d l o r d w a r r a n t s a n d 
r e p r e s e n t s t h a t L a n d l o r d lias good and m a r k e t a b l e t i t l e t o 
t h e r e a l p r o p e r t y o f w h i c h t h e P r e m i s e s form a p a r t , f r e e 
and c l e a r of a l l l i e n s and encumbrances e x c e p t m o r t g a g e s . 
ARTICLE 17 
M i s c e l l a n e o u s P r o v i s i o n s 
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 • * N o n w a i v e r . T h e f a i l u r e o f e i t h e r p a r t y t o 
i n s i s t o n s t r i c t p e r f o r m a n c e o f a n y t e r m s , c o v e n a n t , or 
c o n d i t i o n h e r e o f , or t o e x e r c i s e any o p t i o n h e r e i n c o n t a i n e d 
s h a l l n o t be c o n s t r u e d as a w a i v e r of such t e r m , c o v e n a n t or 
c o n d i t i o n in any o t h e r i n s t a n c e . 
1 7 . 2 W r i t t e n M o d i f i c a t i o n . T h i s L e a s e A g r e e m e n t 
c a n n o t b e c h a n g e d o r t e r m i na t e d o r a l l y , b u t o n l y by an 
i n s t r u m e n t i n w r i t i n g s s i g n e d by b o t h p a r t i e s . 
J- 7 «3 M e c h a n i c ' s L i e n s . T e n a n t s h a l l w i t h i n 30 d a y s 
a f t e r n o t i c e from Landlord d i s c h a r g e any m e c h a n i c ' s l i e n f o r 
m a t e r i a l s o r l a b o r c l a i m e d t o have been f u r n i s h e d t o t h e 
P r e m i s e s on T e n a n t ' s b e h a l f . 
1 7 . 4 A c c e s s t o P r e m i s e s . L a n d l o r d may e n t e r t h e 
P r e m i s e s a t a n y r e a s o n a b l e t i m e on r e a s o n a b l e n o t i c e t o 
T e n a n t f o r t h e p u r p o s e of i n s p e c t i o n and t o show t h e same t o 
p r o s p e c t i v e m o r t g a g e e s or p u r c h a s e r s . 
*
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 • 5 I n t e r r u p t i o n o f S e r v i c e s . . I n t e r r u p t i o n o r 
c u r t a i l m e n t o f a n y s e r v i c e m a T n t a i n e d i n t h e b u i l d i n g of 
w h i c h t h e P r e m i s e s f o r m a p a r t , o r f u r n i s h e d t o t h e 
P r e m i s e s , i f c a u s e d by s t r i k e s , m e c h a n i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s , or 
a n y c a u s e s b e y o n d L a n d l o r d ' s c o n t r o l whether s i m i l a r or 
d i s s i m i l a r t o t h o s e e n u m e r a t e d , s h a l l not e n t i t l e Tenant t o 
a n y c l a i m s a g a i n s t Landlord or t o any abatement i n r e n t , nor 
s h a l l t h e same c o n s t i t u t e c o n s t r u c t i v e or p a r t i a l e v i c t i o n , 
u n l e s s L a n d l o r d f a i l s t o t a k e s u c h m e a s u r e s a s may be 
r e a s o n a b l e i n t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s t o r e s t o r e t h e s e r v i c e 
w i t h o u t u n d u e d e l a y . I f t h e P r e m i s e s a r e r e n d e r e d u n f i t i n 
w h o l e o r i n p a r t f o r t h e u s e s s p e c i f i e d i n t h i s L e a s e 
A g r e e m e n t , f o r a p e r i o d of more than t e n d a y s , by t h e making 
o f r e p a i r s , r e p l a c e m e n t s or a d d i t i o n s , o t h e r than t h o s e made 
w i t h T e n a n t ' s c o n s e n t o r c a u s e d by m i s u s e or n e g l e c t by 
T e n a n t o r T e n a n t ' s a g e n t s , s e r v a n t s , c u s t o m e r s , v i s i t o r s or 
l i c e n s e e s , t h e r e shaLl be a p r o p o r t i o n a t e a b a t e m e n t of r e n t 
d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d of such u n f i t n e s s . 
*
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« 6 No R e p r e s e n t a t i o n s . N e i t h e r p a r t y has made any 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o r p r o m i s e s , e x c e p t as c o n t a i n e d in t h i s 
L e a s e Agreement . 
1 7 . 7 T e n a n t E s t o p p e l C e r t i f i c a t e s . Tenant s h a l l form 
t i m e t o t i m e , u p o n n o t l e s s t h a n t e n d a y s p r i o r w r i t t e n 
r e q u e s t by L a n d l o r d , e x e c u t e , a c k n o w l e d g e , and d e l i v e r t o 
L a n d l o r d a w r i t t e n s t a t e m e n t c e r t i f y i n g t h a t t h i s L e a s e 
A g r e e m e n t i s u n m o d i f i e d a n d i n f u l l f o r c e and e f f e c t (or 
t h a t t h e s a m e i s i n f u l l f o r c e a n d e f f e c t as m o d i f i e d , 
l i s t i n g t h e i n s t r u m e n t s o f m o d i f i c a t i o n ) , . t h e d a t e s t o which 
t h e r e n t a n d o t h e r c h a r g e s have been p a i d , and whether or 
n o t t o t h e b e s t of T e n a n t ' s knowledge Landlord i s in d e f a u l t 
h e r e u n d e r ( a n d i f s o , s p e c i f y i n g t h e n a t u r e o f e a c h 
d e f a u l t ) . 
1 7 . 8 L a n d l o r d E s t o p p e l C e r t i f i c a t e s . Landlord s h a l l 
f r o m t i m e t o t i m e , upon not l e s s than ten 3 a y s p r i o r w r i t t e n 
r e q u e s t by T e n a n t , e x e c u t e , a c k n o w l e d g e , and d e l i v e r to 
Tenant a w r i t t e n statement c e r t i f y i n g as lo tho matters s e t 
f o r t h i n A r t i c l e 1 7 . 7 , except that i t s h a l l c e r t i f y whether 
or not t o t h e b e s t of L a n d l o r d ' s knowledge Tenant i s in 
d e f a u l t hereunder , and i f s o , s p e c i f y i n g the nature of each 
d e f a u l t . 
1 7 . ° Memorandum of L e a s e . At the request of e i t h e r 
p a r t y , the other party w i l l execute , acknowledge and d e l i v e r 
t o t h e p a r t y request ing the same a short form or memorandum 
of t h i s Lease Agreement in form for record ing . 
1 7 . 1 0 C a p t i o n s . The c a p t i o n s in t h i s Lease Agreement 
a r e i n c l u d e d f o r c o n v e n i e n c e only and s h a l l not be taken 
i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n in any c o n s t r u c t i o n or i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 
t h i s Lease Agreement or any of i t s p r o v i s i o n s . 
1 7 . 1 1 B i n d i n g E f f e c t . T h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s L e a s e 
A g r e e m e n t s h a l l a p p l y t o , b ind and i n u r e t o t h e b e n e f i t of 
L a n d l o r d a n d T e n a n t , and t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e s u c c e s s o r s , l e g a l 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s and a s s i g n ; i t b e i n g u n d e r s t o o d t h a t t h e 
t e r m " L a n d l o r d " a s u s e d i n t h i s L e a s e Agreement means o n l y 
t h e o w n e r , o r t h e m o r t g a g e e i n p o s s e s s i o n s o t h a t i n t h e 
e v e n t o f a n y s a l e or s a l e s of s a i d r e a l p r o p e r t y or of any 
g r o u n d l e a s e t h e r e o f o r i f t h e m o r t g a g e e s h a l l t a k e 
p o s s e s s i o n t h e r e o f , t h e L a n d l o r d n a m e d h e r e i n s h a l l be 
e n t i r e l y f r e e d and r e l i e v e d of a l l c o v e n a n t s and o b l i g a t i o n s 
o f L a n d l o r d h e r e u n d e r a c c r u i n g t h e r e a f t e r , and i t s h a l l be 
d e e m e d w i t h o u t f u r t h e r a g r e e m e n t that* t h e p u r c h a s e r , t h e 
g r o u n d l e s s e e or t h e m o r t g a g e e in p o s s e s s i o n has assumed and 
a g r e e d t o c a r r y o u t any and a l l c o v e n a n t s and o b l i g a t i o n of 
Landlord h e r e u n d e r . 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, L a n d l o r d a n d T e n a n t h a v e d u l y 
e x e c u t e d t h i s L e a s e Agreement t h e day and y e a r f i r s t a b o v e 
w r i t t e n . 
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